Alternatives to Revoking MFN From China

Alternatives to Revoking MFN From China

by Douglas H. Paal
July 1, 1997

The contention of this essay is that although many real problems bedevil our relations with the Peoples Republic of China (P.R.C.), there is more cause for optimism than pessimism. Nevertheless, we cannot rely on long-term mood swings anymore than we should rely on short-term ones. The United States should draw lessons from both the positive and negative experiences of past and contemporary dealings with China, and move to pragmatic steps that will increase the chances of a positive-sum relationship with the P.R.C.

No weed in any garden emerges with greater persistence or more frustrating consequences than our annual national debate over whether to extend normal trading relations with China (known as MFN, or most-favored-nation trade status). Every spring the President is required to affirm the weed’s existence, to note that the denial of MFN would harm relations with China to an unacceptable extent, and to offer measures to show critics of the trading relationship that normal trade relations can be turned to good advantage in relations with China.

To use a gardening metaphor for the annual MFN debate is not to trivialize the issues, but to point to the need to get around the frustrating terms in which the debate is framed. It is unfortunate that members of Congress find themselves, year after year, offered only a clumsy, all-or-nothing vote on whether to continue normal terms of trade with China, or to deny MFN and thereby express disapproval of Chinese behavior, mistrust of Chinese intentions, or discontent with the incumbent Administration’s management of Chinese affairs.

It is true that U.S.-China relations are deeply troubled, and that they are likely to remain so for the next quarter century, if not beyond. There are so many lists of these troubles that it would be redundant to repeat them here. Just examine any of the major American journals, emanating from left, right, and center, and the issues are amply detailed. Moreover, the U.S. Administration regularly repeats its laundry list of concerns, lest anyone actually begin to form a more upbeat picture of the historical trends than the current snapshot of relations may offer.

The contention of this essay is that although many real problems bedevil our relations with the Peoples Republic of China (P.R.C.), there is more cause for optimism than pessimism. Nevertheless, we cannot rely on long-term mood swings anymore than we should rely on short-term ones. The United States should draw lessons from both the positive and negative experiences of past and contemporary dealings with China, and move to pragmatic steps that will increase the chances of a positive-sum relationship with the P.R.C.