

POLICY ANALYSIS

ADVANCE RELEASE
page numbers are not final

Electing a New Japanese Security Policy? Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic Party of Japan

Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, & Aki Mori



LEIF-ERIC EASLEY is a PhD candidate at Harvard University's Department of Government, a Visiting Scholar at the University of Southern California's Korean Studies Institute, and a Kelly Fellow with the Pacific Forum-Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He can be reached at <easley@fas.harvard.edu>.

TETSUO KOTANI is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Doshisha University, and is concurrently a research fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation. He can be reached at <tetsuo.kotani@gmail.com>.

AKI MORI is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Doshisha University, and is concurrently a research fellow at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation. She can be reached at <akimori401@gmail.com>.

NOTE ≈ The authors owe their opportunity for collaboration to the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders Program and the 15th annual Japan-U.S. Security Seminar held in San Francisco, March 27-28, 2009. The authors would like to thank Ralph Cossa, Brad Glosserman, Sheila Smith, Daniel Sneider, Hiroki Takeuchi, and two anonymous reviewers for constructive comments, as well as numerous Japanese policymakers for sharing their views in not-for-attribution interviews.

KEYWORDS: DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN; INTERNATIONAL SECURITY; FOREIGN POLICY; INDEPENDENT DIPLOMACY; MATURE ALLIANCE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

To address uncertainties about the direction of Japanese security policy and its increasing connection with domestic politics this article examines the foreign policy visions within the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

MAIN ARGUMENT

There are five main tenets of the DPJ's envisioned "independent diplomacy":

- pursuing a more "mature" alliance in which Japan is less dependent on and deferential to the U.S.
- re-establishing Japan as a "member of Asia" through economic and trade initiatives, historical reconciliation, and multilateral institution-building
- contributing to international security through the UN, with Japan providing financing, peacekeepers, and impetus for reform
- working for nuclear disarmament via international, regional, and bilateral diplomatic efforts
- modernizing Japan's national security apparatus to prioritize citizen rights and taxpayer savings

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

- Drastic changes to Japanese foreign policy are unlikely as the DPJ faces the practical realities of governing and looks to prove itself before Upper House elections in 2010.
- Despite the challenges of stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq, combating piracy, and searching North Korean vessels, the political bar for international operations by Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) will likely rise.
- A DPJ government will maintain the U.S. alliance but may scale back the LDP goal of a global security partnership by limiting the scope of the alliance to Japan's defense and regional stability.
- In the process of differentiating the DPJ from the LDP and taking political advantage of the unpopularity of Bush administration foreign policies, the DPJ made promises to the Japanese public. A DPJ government would likely address at least some of those promises so as not to lose credibility.
- In particular, the DPJ may seek to modify plans for alliance transformation, thereby opening up contentious debates about roles and missions, financial support, basing, and the relocation of U.S. marines from Okinawa to Guam.

Despite a dynamic international environment and frequent turnover in prime ministers, Japanese foreign and security policy has been impressively stable. Although the trajectory of Japan's postwar security policy has by no means been linear, change has been gradual, exhibiting clear trends under constraints. Japan has pursued modest increases in military capabilities while retaining a solidly defensive orientation and has pursued modest expansions in security roles and missions while remaining within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

This foreign policy behavior entertains a number of well-known explanations for Japan's international relations including reluctant realism, strategic culture arguments, and economically sensitive hedging strategies.¹ Academics and policy experts have over time considered a wide array of important factors behind Japanese security policy: national interests (maintaining reliable security at low cost), constitutional constraints on the military (Article IX and its interpretation over the right of collective defense), institutional inertia (alliance-related bureaucracy and procedures), strategic balancing (against a rising China), *gaiatsu* (diplomatic pressure from Washington), threat perception (North Korean nuclear and missile programs), and economic considerations (budgetary limitations and burden-sharing), among other variables.

International security analysts not specializing in Japanese politics will be surprised to find a major factor for explaining other countries' foreign policies missing from this list. Although Japan is widely known as a democratic country, domestic politics surrounding political parties is rarely employed as an explanation of Japan's international relations. The reason for this—and arguably the main reason why Japan's foreign policy has been so stable—is that the same political party has controlled the government for nearly the entire postwar era. One-party dominance in Japan has insulated the country's foreign relations from inter-party differences. As a result of the August 30, 2009, legislative elections, however, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) will take control of the government for the first time from the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), exposing Japanese foreign policy to a significant electoral shift.

Given this is the first time since 1955 that a second party has fully taken the reigns of government, a common question is on the lips of foreign policy

¹ Michael Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).

analysts in and outside Japan: how will Japanese security policy change under the DPJ government?² This article endeavors to answer that question. The focus here, however, is not the current political positioning in Japan, which could change significantly over a period of weeks. Nor does the present analysis buy into the media hype about how the DPJ may downgrade Japan's alliance with the United States—a fear ignited by Ichiro Ozawa's off-the-cuff remark in February 2009.³ Instead, this paper considers the long-term foreign policy visions of prominent members and factions of the DPJ. The relative weight of these different foreign policy visions will no doubt fluctuate as the partisan and factional landscape develops over the coming months and years. These visions, however, are expected to remain important to Japanese political debates for the foreseeable future and grow in policy importance while the DPJ is in power.

This essay is divided into eight sections:

- ≈ pp. 5–6 provide background on the DPJ, including its rise and political orientation
- ≈ pp. 6–10 outline the DPJ vision of a “mature” U.S.-Japan alliance
- ≈ pp. 10–11 consider the DPJ goal of re-establishing Japan as a “member of Asia”
- ≈ pp. 11–12 examine the DPJ's proposed contributions to global security through the United Nations
- ≈ pp. 12–14 address DPJ nuclear nonproliferation policy and vision for a “nuclear-free world”
- ≈ pp. 14–15 inspect the DPJ promise to reform Japan's national security budget
- ≈ pp. 15–18 investigate the DPJ's pre-election positioning and new foreign policy pragmatism
- ≈ pp. 18–22 conclude with implications for Japanese foreign policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance

² The LDP briefly lost power for less than a year in 1993–94, but the governing coalition that excluded the LDP arguably did not include as credible a second party as the DPJ, which has led a coalition controlling the Upper House since 2007 and won control of the more powerful Lower House in the August 30, 2009, election. On the LDP's dominance, the party's brief loss of power in the early 1990s, and the history of opposition parties in Japan, see Ray Christensen, *Ending the LDP Hegemony: Party Cooperation in Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000); and Ethan Scheiner, *Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

³ Ozawa's comment implied that the current level of U.S. forces in Japan is unnecessarily large and that only the presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet would be sufficient. “Ozawa's National Security Comment Causes a Stir,” *Asahi Shimbun*, March 2, 2009, <http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200903020074.html>. He later clarified that his 7th Fleet comment was not a concrete policy proposal but rather a symbolic remark reflecting his desire for Japan to do more for itself and reduce the U.S. troop presence for the people on Okinawa. See Daniel Sneider's interview with Ozawa, “Ichiro Ozawa: Ozawa in His Own Words,” in *Oriental Economist* (June 2009): 5–6.

THE RISE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN

The DPJ was established in 1998 when a diverse group of smaller parties merged together. Ichiro Ozawa's Liberal Party was folded into the DPJ in 2003. The result is a party that is an amalgamation of former socialists, LDP-defectors, grass-roots NGO activists, former bureaucrats, and former corporate executives. The DPJ's center-left platform was initially popular with nonaligned voters in large cities. Ozawa later broadened support for the party in traditional rural strongholds of the LDP by prioritizing daily life issues of citizens and distancing the DPJ from neoliberal economic policies of the LDP.

The DPJ aspires to transform Japan's democracy into a true two-party system and has steadily increased its presence in both legislative houses since 1998. The only major exception was the September 2005 Lower House election, in which the DPJ lost more than 60 seats. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi achieved a dramatic electoral victory for the LDP, ironically by running against the old guard in his own party. Koizumi presented a vision that borrowed reforms from the DPJ platform while promising greater economic vitality and smaller government. The "Koizumi reform" soon met with rollback from within the LDP, however, as the plan was blamed for Japan's widening income gap.

The DPJ meanwhile scored domestic political points by criticizing the LDP as being too supportive of the unpopular U.S.-led war in Iraq. Major domestic developments—the mismanaged pension program, corruption scandals involving cabinet ministers, historical issues, and the unpopular health care system—combined with high oil prices and the international financial crisis to consistently put the LDP on defense. Koizumi's successors, Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda, and Taro Aso, thus had difficulty maintaining public support. Especially after the August 2007 election in which the DPJ took control of the Upper House, the LDP leadership experienced more difficulty implementing policy than ever before. With a politically divided legislature known as the "twisted Diet," Japanese politics faced gridlock until the Lower House election of August 30, 2009.

The conventional wisdom about the DPJ is that as a union of former members of ideologically different parties and a new generation of politicians, the party is disjointed and contains competing foreign policy visions. The current lack of an outright majority in the Upper House also forces the DPJ to listen to the diverse views of smaller parties in order to control the chamber. Nonetheless, a common theme emerges from a careful reading of DPJ policy

documents and public statements: that Japan's "passive" foreign policy needs to be transformed with clear-cut will into a new "independent diplomacy."

The question then becomes: what does "independent" mean? Generally, this is code for becoming less deferential to U.S. foreign policy. In particular, the DPJ believes in asserting Japan's position in alliance management and working more closely with the United Nations. The vast majority of DPJ members consider the U.S.-Japan alliance an essential stabilizer in the Asia-Pacific region but are reluctant to work with the United States in ways that involve dispatching the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) overseas. DPJ members tend to worry about Japanese entanglement in the U.S. global strategy and are allergic to the use of force and sharing the cost of military operations.

In order to understand the DPJ concept of independent diplomacy, this paper makes use of numerous primary sources underutilized in English language analyses, including the DPJ's "Basic Policies" (April 1998 under party president Naoto Kan), election platforms (April 2001 under party president Yukio Hatoyama, October 2003 under party president Naoto Kan, July 2004 under party president Katsuya Okada, August 2005 under party president Okada, July 2007 under party president Ozawa, and July 2009 under party president Hatoyama), public statements by prominent DPJ politicians who have served in key positions for the DPJ, and author interviews with DPJ foreign policy aides and advisors.⁴ This article thus attempts to make a modest but lasting contribution to the international understanding of various foreign policy visions that in large part define the DPJ and are increasingly influencing Japan's international relations.

ACHIEVING A "MATURE ALLIANCE" WITH THE UNITED STATES

The DPJ's "Basic Policy" puts the alliance with the United States at the center of Japan's security policy, and other major policy statements also endorse the alliance. After Ozawa's resignation as president of the DPJ, Yukio Hatoyama and Katsuya Okada ran for the party's top leadership post, and

⁴ For English texts of the DPJ's "Basic Policy" and various election platforms (manifestos), see the DPJ website, www.dpj.or.jp/english/policy/index.html. Interviews were conducted in semi-structured fashion and in a not-for-attribution manner to allow frankness on sensitive policy matters and intra-party differences. Over a dozen DPJ-related individuals were interviewed, having been selected for their relevance to the policymaking process and different factional allegiances.

Hatoyama was elected on May 16, 2009.⁵ Both Hatoyama and Okada profess that the U.S. military presence has been stabilizing in Asia.⁶ The 2005 election platform regards the alliance as a “public good” in the Asia-Pacific region, indicating that the DPJ agrees with the LDP that Japan needs the United States for both national defense and regional stability.

The DPJ position differs with the LDP on the issue of global cooperation with the United States. Prominent DPJ members are reluctant to work with the “unilateral” United States, especially in dispatching the JSDF abroad. DPJ members voice concerns about Japan becoming integrated in U.S. global campaigns and helping shoulder the burdens of military operations. Therefore, it is DPJ policy to demand close public oversight of Japanese security cooperation with the United States.

At the beginning of negotiations for the antiterrorism special measures law in 2001, there was a possibility that the DPJ would support sending the JSDF overseas in a bipartisan manner. The DPJ referred to the initial Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) plan for refueling operations in the Indian Ocean as “appropriate.” Yet the DPJ ultimately voted against the antiterrorism special measures bill because it did not stipulate that prior approval must be granted by the Diet for overseas deployments.⁷

Thereafter, the DPJ determined to pursue “transparency” of the JMSDF’s operation in the war on terrorism. The party’s subsequent faultfinding of the mission portrayed an inflexibility and unwillingness to work with the United States in the war on terrorism for both political and ideological reasons. The DPJ voted against the extension of the law in 2003, 2005, and 2006, but to little effect other than a show of opposition. Tension between the DPJ and U.S. government was apparent when Ambassador Thomas Schieffer personally requested DPJ support for the renewal of the law (on the grounds that the

⁵ Despite his resignation, Ozawa remains a fulcrum of policymaking behind the scenes and an authoritative voice on security issues to the DPJ’s various factions. Though Ozawa has tailored his message to the politics of the day, many of his long-standing views endure. See Ichiro Ozawa, *Nihon Kaizou Keikaku* [Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1994).

⁶ Katsuya Okada, “Koizumi seiji to no gonon: Kiakaku to gaiko wo kensho” [Five Years with the Koizumi Politics: Inspecting Reforms and Diplomacy], Katsuya Okada website, http://www.katsuya.net/report/koizumiseiji/pdf/koizumiseiji_1-4.pdf; and Yukio Hatoyama, “Our View of the World Today” (conference presentation, CLSA/Japan Forum, Tokyo, February 23, 2009, http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/speech/090223_en.html).

⁷ “Toshukaidanga ketsuretsu: Yotoga kokkai no jizen shonin wo kyohi hoan ni wa hantai, Hatoyama daihyo ga hyomei” [Party Leadership Meeting Collapsed: The Ruling Party Rejected Proper Approval of the Diet, President Hatoyama Opposes the Bill], DPJ website, October 15, 2001, <http://www.dpj.or.jp/news/?num=2572>.

U.S.-led counterterrorism operation was authorized by the UN) and Ozawa adamantly rejected the request.⁸

The DPJ scored points with the Japanese public by criticizing the mission on suspicions that the United States may have used JMSDF-supplied fuel for operations in Iraq. After the DPJ took control of the Upper House, the party was able to vote down the extension of the Indian Ocean mission in 2007 and 2008, forcing the ruling coalition to overrule the Upper House with a two-thirds vote in the Lower House. The Iraq War deepened and popularized the DPJ belief that to cooperate with “unilateral” U.S. policy is against Japanese national interests.

On the grounds that no Iraqi WMDs and no substantial linkage between the Hussein regime and al Qaeda were found, the DPJ regarded the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq as illegitimate and criticized Prime Minister Koizumi’s support of it. Hatoyama insisted that Koizumi’s decision to dispatch the JSDF to Iraq was misguided and hurt Japan’s national interests by narrowing the range of choice for Japan’s foreign policy.⁹

DPJ members saw the LDP’s cooperation with the United States on Iraq and the broader war on terrorism as a sign of obedience to the United States. DPJ election platforms called for the immediate withdrawal of Japan Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces from Iraq. This was a clear rejection of the concept of a “U.S.-Japan global alliance,” which was launched through the cooperation of the Koizumi and Bush administrations.

So how does the DPJ envision alliance cooperation differently from LDP policies? First, regarding the refueling operation in the Indian Ocean, the DPJ leadership has shown some flexibility by hinting that the mission would be continued for a certain duration after the DPJ comes to power, despite negative statements about the mission in the past. Hatoyama has said that rushing to halt the refueling operation would be “reckless,” and Okada has suggested that the DPJ will make a decision within the operation’s current time limit.¹⁰ The DPJ may be pressured, however, to again vote down the refueling operation because the party’s coalition partners are against it. In any event, the DPJ will likely de-emphasize the refueling operation among Japan’s contributions on counterterrorism. It is reported that Hatoyama would consider an expanded

⁸ Masami Ito, “Ozawa Rejects Schieffer Antiterror Overture,” *Japan Times*, August 9, 2007, <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070809a1.html>.

⁹ Yukio Hatoyama, “Kempo kaisei shian no chukan hokoku” [Interim Report of My Private Proposal on Constitutional Revision], <http://www.hatoyama.gr.jp/cont03/tes/shian1.doc>, 2.

¹⁰ “Hatoyama Says DPJ-led Government Would Keep Refueling Ops in Indian Ocean,” Associated Press, July 18, 2009.

Japanese role in stabilizing Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the goal of building trust with the Obama administration.¹¹ Seiji Maehara also has suggested that the DPJ will continue to engage in Afghanistan's reconstruction, including more active involvement of NGOs, transportation services by the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, capacity-building of the police in Afghanistan, and provisions for medical services.¹²

Second, regarding alliance management, the 2005 DPJ party platform calls for a "clear basic policy for Japan-U.S. joint [defense] actions" so that the alliance can work as an "anchor" in dealing with various security issues. Most DPJ election platforms call for a review of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) "within three years" to expand Japan's discretionary power. References to review and inspect Japanese financial subsidies for U.S. forces in Japan (Host Nation Support) occasionally appear in policy statements as well.

Even more significant is the DPJ promise to examine the U.S. force structure in Japan, especially in Okinawa. The 2001 platform envisioned a review of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Report.¹³ The 2003 platform called for the reorganization and reduction of U.S. bases reflecting the security environment in Asia. The 2004 and 2005 election platforms called for transferring U.S. Marines Corp Bases in Okinawa abroad, while demanding prompt return of the Futenma Air Station. In the spring of 2009, Maehara stated that the DPJ will call for a "new blueprint" to replace the existing agreement for the Futenma airport's relocation.¹⁴

The 2007 DPJ platform condemned the U.S. base realignment package, including the transfer of 8,000 marines to Guam, on grounds that the plan is indifferent to the opinions of Japanese citizens. In particular, the DPJ demands that the Diet re-examine the costs to be borne by the Japanese side. Accordingly, the DPJ voted against the Guam transfer agreement in the Lower and Upper Houses, arguing that the government's explanation for the \$6 billion cost was insufficient. The realignment of U.S. forces was ultimately endorsed by the Diet, and because the Guam agreement is a treaty, the decision of the Lower House dominates and no two-thirds overrule of an Upper House protest was

¹¹ "Kaiji no indoyou kyuyu katsudo, Hatoyama daihyo toomen wa keizoku" [Hatoyama Says the JSMD's Refueling Mission in Indian Ocean Will Be Continued for Certain Duration], *Yomiuri Online*, July 17, 2009, <http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/news/20090717-OYT1T01069.htm>.

¹² Seiji Maehara, "Nichibeidomei, kongo no renkei kadai" [Agendas of the Japan-U.S. Alliance for Further Coordination] (speech at the 3rd Seapower Dialogue, Washington, D.C., April 16, 2009), <http://www.maehara21.com/blog/straight.php?itemid=1166>.

¹³ "The SACO Final Report," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 2, 1996, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/96saco1.html>.

¹⁴ Maehara, "Nichibeidomei, kongo no renkei kadai."

necessary. The DPJ's policy of rejecting the Guam transfer in its current form, however, and calling for a new blueprint for the relocation of Futenma could result in increased friction and possible alliance stagnation over the U.S. force structure in Japan.

RE-ESTABLISHING JAPAN AS A "MEMBER OF ASIA"

DPJ party platforms address Japan's wartime aggression and insist that Japan, as a "member of Asia," build relations of trust with neighboring countries while deepening diplomatic and economic ties. DPJ politicians have pledged not to visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine and instead push for a secular memorial to honor Japan's war dead.¹⁵ The 2005 platform calls for "rebuilding" Japan-China relations as a "top priority" by deepening and institutionalizing dialogue on economics, finance, energy, environment, maritime development, and security, while "strengthening" relations with South Korea by concluding a free trade agreement (FTA). Regarding Taiwan, the DPJ is against Taiwan unilateral independence as well as mainland China's use of force against Taiwan. The 2005 platform envisions building an "East Asian Community" with FTAs and economic partnership agreements (EPA) and improving transnational cooperation on energy, environment, education, public health, and law enforcement.

Reaching out to regional neighbors is not controversial in Japan, but the DPJ's emphasis on engaging Asia is intended to contrast with Koizumi's emphasis on U.S.-Japan relations that some DPJ members charge as coming at the expense of positive relations with Asian countries. Hatoyama insisted that "Japan should not forget its identity as an Asian country" even while he recognized that the Japan-U.S. alliance remains a cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy and important in realizing a "greater discipline for China's massive economy along with measures to reduce the threat posed by that nation's military."¹⁶

The DPJ understanding of the U.S. stabilizing role in Asia is in line with the existing goal of Japanese security policy: maintaining reliable national security at low cost. In contrast to recent LDP administrations, however, prominent DPJ members such as Hatoyama and Okada see the Japan-U.S.

¹⁵ Recently DPJ president Yukio Hatoyama said that neither he nor any of his cabinet ministers would visit Yasukuni. Daisuke Wakabayashi, "Hatoyama Pledges Not to Visit Yasukuni Shrine," *Wall Street Journal*, August 12, 2009.

¹⁶ Hatoyama, "Kempo kaisei shian no chukan hokoku," 4.

alliance as limited to bilateral cooperation for national and regional security. DPJ members tend to shy away from a more international role for the alliance and believe strongly in the need for other mechanisms and efforts to build a regional framework in Asia based on economic and political cooperation among Asian states.

One exception is Akihisa Nagashima, a member of the House of Representatives and vice secretary general of the DPJ, who insists that the Japan-U.S. alliance should lead multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.¹⁷ However, Nagashima did not appear to be a strong policymaking voice in the DPJ in the run up to the August 30, 2009, election, because he was not a member of the standing officers' council. The mainstream of DPJ members express a desire for Japanese foreign policy to increasingly direct attention outside the U.S.-Japan alliance.

CONTRIBUTING TO GLOBAL SECURITY THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS

The DPJ calls for active contributions by Japan to the UN and seeks a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, while envisioning other reforms for the international body on voting rules, spending, and institutional organization. The DPJ takes a positive stance on UN peacekeeping operations and relaxation of rules of engagement so that Japan can be more directly involved in peace-building. Moreover, the 2004 and 2005 platforms refer to the possibility of establishing a new “international peace cooperation force” to respond to UN requests. Ozawa in particular is known to support this idea as a contribution toward more effective peace-building efforts by the UN.

The DPJ defends constraints in Article IX of the constitution on the JSDF's use of force and officially concurs with the Cabinet Legislation Bureau's interpretation that Japan possesses the right of collective defense but is constrained from using it by the constitution. While many LDP members support reinterpretation or even revision of Article IX so that Japan could have more flexibility in international security operations, a critical mass of DPJ members consider Article IX integral to Japan's national identity and a shield from U.S. pressure to contribute to international efforts that may not be in Japan's core national interests.

¹⁷ Akihisa Nagashima, *Nichibeidoumei no Atarashii Sekkeizu* [A New Blueprint of the Japan-U.S. Alliance] (Tokyo: Nihon hyoron sha, 2004).

Notably, however, Hatoyama made a push in 2008 to approve limited use of the right of collective defense in order to avoid the damage to Japan's diplomatic credibility that would follow from not being able to come to the defense of allied and friendly forces in the field.¹⁸ Hatoyama argued that limited use of collective defense for counterattack by the JSDF in situations in areas surrounding Japan as well as during a UN mission is guaranteed constitutionally. At the same time, Hatoyama emphasized that the government of Japan, and specifically the Diet, may judge the necessity of participation in a UN mission, meaning that Japan need not join every mission requested by the UN.

DPJ members are eager to contribute to global security by working with the UN rather than with the United States because they believe that Koizumi's government went too far in Iraq and that Japan thus needs to disentangle itself from the United States in overseas operations. In his draft proposal for a revised constitution, Hatoyama clearly rejected the dispatch of JSDF for missions in areas not directly related to Japan's security without authorization by the UN. Hatoyama insisted, "in approving Japan's right of collective defense, there is a concern that Japan will be entangled in one-sided use of force by the U.S. in a global range... However, the right of collective defense is Japan's right under international law, and does not mean that Japan is automatically obliged to join missions with its allies."¹⁹ Hatoyama's personal views on collective defense and overseas deployment are closer to the LDP's than are those of Okada and others who insist that JSDF overseas activities should only be conducted under UN authorization and under UN command.²⁰

Members of the DPJ vary in terms of their enthusiasm for Japanese contributions to UN peacekeeping, but there is a general consensus within the party that Japan's international security contributions should fall more under UN auspices than a "U.S.-Japan global alliance" as advanced by the Koizumi and Bush administrations.

WORKING FOR A "NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD"

Prominent DPJ members such as Hatoyama, Okada, and Ozawa are generally reluctant to broaden international security cooperation with the United States. There is an important exception, however. President Obama's

¹⁸ Hatoyama, "Kempo kaisei shian no chukan hokoku," 5.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Katyuya Okada, "Fukamaru konmei, Nihon no shinro wa" [Deepening Turmoil in Japan, Where Japan Will Go] (conference presentation, 7th Asahi Asia Fellow Forum, Tokyo, March 30, 2009), <http://www.asahi.com/international/aan/hatsu/hatsu090414.html>.

April 2009 speech on a “nuclear-free world” had a positive impact on the DPJ’s willingness to work with the United States on this issue.²¹ The DPJ has consistently stressed—including in election platforms for 2003, 2005, and 2007—the need for Japan to lead on the issue of nuclear disarmament. Okada, in particular, in his bid for the DPJ presidency, spoke of the need for working with the Obama administration on global agenda items where Japanese and U.S. values overlap. The DPJ opposes the recent U.S.-Indian nuclear agreement, however, arguing that it sends the wrong message to Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea and that India should join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).²²

Okada has advocated the elimination of nuclear weapons for many years and is one of the founding members of the “league of DPJ Diet members promoting arms control.” In 2008, this group published a draft proposal of a treaty to create a non-nuclear area in Northeast Asia with the goal of strengthening international norms of non-use, nonproliferation, and disarmament.²³ Okada has offered three specific proposals for the May 2010 NPT review conference to be held in New York: no first-use of nuclear weapons, prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against countries that do not possess them, and establishing a nuclear weapons free zone treaty for Northeast Asia. In May 2009 the DPJ shadow foreign minister, Yoshio Hachiro, said that a nuclear-free zone is the way for Japan to “escape from the [U.S.] nuclear umbrella.”²⁴

Hence, the nuclear-free vision held by many in the DPJ contradicts the extended deterrence provided to Japan by the United States. The extended deterrence issue has become increasingly relevant in the eyes of the LDP because of North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. The DPJ has not resolved the contradiction, but due to the perception of the North Korean nuclear and missile threat among the public, which is emotionally intensified by the abductions issue, the DPJ has been cautious not to sound soft on North Korea. DPJ policy statements approve of economic sanctions against North Korea and have also called for reinforcing Japan’s maritime

²¹ The text of President Obama’s April 5, 2009, speech in Prague is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.

²² Yoshiro Hachiro and Keiichiro Asao, “Statement Following the Approval of a Nuclear Power Agreement Proposed by the US Which Exempts India from Certain Export Restrictions,” DPJ webpage, September 11, 2008, <http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/080918/04.html>.

²³ Katsuyta Okada, “Tohoku Ajia hikaku heiki chitai joyakuan” [A Proposal of Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Treaty], Katsuya Okaza webpage, August 14, 2008, http://www.katsuya.net/upload/pdf/joyaku_honbun.pdf.

²⁴ “Okada Meets ICNND Co-Chair Evans,” DPJ webpage, May 27, 2009, available at <http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/?num=16114>.

security posture to counter North Korean spy boats and smuggling. When it comes to international efforts at nuclear nonproliferation—including North Korea—the DPJ appears to attach a high level of importance to coordinating with the United States.

MODERNIZING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The DPJ “Basic Policy” clearly states that the party will uphold the principles of Japan’s national security policy—an exclusively defensive doctrine, no exercise of collective self-defense, the three non-nuclear principles, no use of force abroad, and maintaining civilian control. Meanwhile, the DPJ has called for legislation to protect basic human rights from the government in a national security emergency. Despite the enactment of national emergency legislation in 2003, the 2004 and 2005 DPJ platforms recommended passing an “emergency basic law” and establishing an “emergency management agency” to respond to armed attack, terrorism, and major natural disasters.

The 2003, 2004, and 2005 platforms call for a review of Japan’s military force structure, equipment, and deployment as well as the formulation of a new defense plan flexible enough to deal with various dangers such as missile attack, terrorism, cyber warfare, spy boats, and commandoes. The DPJ takes positive stances on missile defense and measures to protect Japan’s territory, territorial waters, and exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as well as Japan’s claims to the Northern Territories and Senkaku (Diaoyutai) and Takeshima (Dokdo) Islands. The DPJ does not, however, envision an increase in defense spending. Funding for the new defense posture is said to be secured by reducing other items in the defense budget to minimize any additional burden on taxpayers. The 2003 platform identified Japan Ground SDF personnel, armed divisions, and tanks and artillery pieces as areas for reductions.

Despite the DPJ’s fierce opposition to most LDP legislation, the Basic Acts on Ocean Policy and Space were passed in 2007 and 2008, respectively, in a bipartisan manner. Those laws enhance the foundation of Japan’s national defense posture at sea and in outer space. These cases show that the DPJ did not oppose all LDP national security initiatives just for the sake of opposition.

Another such example is the position of some DPJ members on counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. It was Nagashima of the DPJ who first urged the Japanese government to take measures to counter pirates in the waters off Somalia. The DPJ basically agrees with the LDP on the importance of counter-piracy contributions along essential trade routes for Japan. The DPJ objected to the LDP government’s counter-piracy measures bill, however,

preferring that the mission involve coast guard cutters rather than larger naval vessels.²⁵ As piracy challenges are unlikely to be resolved any time soon and require political answers about the role of Japanese forces, maritime security will be an important test case of DPJ national security policy.

PRE-ELECTION POSITIONING AND POLITICAL PRAGMATISM

The DPJ 2009 manifesto, released on July 27, puts greater emphasis on economics and social welfare than on foreign relations and security. Responding to criticism of earlier DPJ foreign policy statements, the 2009 party platform and policy index offer more moderate language on foreign policy, reflecting the political calculations of a party preparing to take over the government.²⁶

On alliance issues, the new manifesto tones down controversial proposals that raised American anxieties. The paper avoids referring to the cancellation of the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, although Hatoyama repeatedly stated that the extension of the refueling mission is not a given.²⁷ The latest manifesto has no clear stipulation of how the DPJ envisions Japan's contributions on Afghanistan and Pakistan, but Hatoyama stated that the DPJ would make up its mind on the refueling mission while considering Japan's direct contributions to Afghan reconstruction.²⁸ The manifesto still proposes a revision of the SOFA and a re-examination of the status of U.S. bases in Japan but avoids setting the previously espoused three-year time limit for revision. The current platform also makes no reference to reviewing the existing Futenma relocation plan, which was negotiated between the United States and the LDP government. Because Hatoyama expressed a priority for

²⁵ Masayuki Naoshima, "Statement on Issuance of Order for Maritime Police Operations Relating to Anti-Piracy Operations off the Coast of Somalia," DPJ webpage, March 13, 2009, <http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/news/index.html?num=15466>.

²⁶ The English version of the revised DPJ 2009 Platform is available at <http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto.html>, and the Policy Index 2009 is available at <http://www.dpj.or.jp/policy/manifesto/seisaku2009/index.html> (Japanese only). The Policy Index supplements the Election Platform, and hereafter the "manifesto" refers to both the 2009 Election Platform and Policy Index for 2009.

²⁷ For example, Hatoyama stated at the debate among party leaders on August 17, 2009, that the DPJ would not automatically extend the refueling mission in January 2010. See "Senkyo: Shuinsen, shuyo roku seito: Toshu toronkai" [Election: Lower House, Debate among Six Major Party Leaders], *Mainichi Shimbun*, August 18, 2009, <http://mainichi.jp/select/seiji/news/20090818ddm010010121000c.html>.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

building trust between President Obama and himself, remarks critical of the United States were purposely removed from the latest manifesto.²⁹

The most recent articulation of DPJ policy even goes so far as to call for the first time for a free trade agreement with the United States. This is significant because the DPJ continues to criticize U.S.-led globalization and what it calls American tendencies toward “market fundamentalism.”³⁰ Yet soon after the DPJ pledged to “promote liberalization of trade and investment through the conclusion of a free trade agreement (FTA) with the United States” the party quickly amended its stance on liberalization by adding supplementary sentences such as: “the measures will not include any which are detrimental to the safety and stable supply of food, increasing Japan’s food self-sufficiency ratio, and the development of Japan’s agricultural industry and farming villages.”³¹

On Asian relations, there is no high-soaring rhetoric in the current policy manifesto about being a “member of Asia.” The paper, however, repeats the DPJ’s traditional approach to Asia—that is, an emphasis on strengthening bilateral relations with South Korea, China, and Taiwan as well as ambitions for East Asian regionalism. The paper also calls for a “division of labor” between Japan and the United States in the international community, suggesting, for example, a greater role for Japan in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

On nuclear weapons issues, the policy outline repeats past enthusiasm for President Obama’s vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and presses Okada’s idea of a nuclear-free area in Northeast Asia. A controversial matter not discussed in the DPJ 2009 manifesto is the future of the three non-nuclear principles. Given recent public discussion of Japan’s historically tacit agreement on the introduction of nuclear weapons aboard U.S. warships, Hatoyama at first indicated his flexibility by hinting that the DPJ might revise the three principles so that Japan could accept U.S. nuclear-armed vessels.³² Later Hatoyama stated, however, that the DPJ would investigate the tacit agreement and also consider enshrining the non-nuclear principles into law—

²⁹ “Senkyo: Shuinsen, shuyo roku seito: Toshi toronkai.”

³⁰ See, for example, Yukio Hatoyama, “Japan Must Shake Off U.S.-style Globalization,” *Christian Science Monitor*, August 19, 2009, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0819/p09s07-coop.html>.

³¹ “Supplementary Sentences to Clarify Expressions in the DPJ Manifesto,” DPJ webpage, August 11, 2009, http://www.dpj.or.jp/english/manifesto/manifesto2009_addition.html. On how the DPJ’s stance remains unclear on the liberalization of sensitive agricultural sectors if an FTA with the United States were to be concluded, see Weston Konishi, “The Democratic Party of Japan: Its Foreign Policy Position and Implications for U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service, CRS Report for Congress, R40758, August 12, 2009, 9.

³² “Kakutosaikan kiko tsuka no yonin wo shisa Minshu Hatoyamashi” [DPJ Hatoyama Hints Accepting the Visits and Transit of Nuclear-armed Vessels], Nikkei Net, July 14, 2009. <http://www.nikkei.co.jp/news/main/20090715AT3S1402B14072009.html>.

strictly prohibiting the manufacture, possession, or introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan.³³ The DPJ considers nuclear issues a great opportunity for cooperation with the Obama administration but has not yet squared its desire for disarmament with the maintenance of a credible U.S. nuclear umbrella in the face of the North Korean nuclear and missile threats.

Regarding the UN, the 2009 DPJ manifesto is in line with previous policy but clearly distinguishes participation in UN collective security activities from the exercise of self-defense. The new policy paper states that the DPJ will free itself from old debates over individual and collective self-defense (regarding Article IX of the constitution) while defending Japan under a strictly defensive national security policy. Despite his personal belief to the contrary, Hatoyama recently denied the possibility of revising the constitutional interpretation on collective self-defense.³⁴ Hatoyama also expressed his intention to ignore the report of the advisory panel on the revision of the National Defense Program Guidelines (*taiko*), including the panel's recommendation for dropping the ban on collective self-defense.³⁵

On piracy and other maritime security issues, although the DPJ voted against the LDP's anti-piracy law, the new manifesto states that the JMSDF can be used for anti-piracy missions if the situation is beyond the Japanese coast guard's capabilities. Moreover, Hatoyama recognized in the debate among party leaders on August 17, 2009, that the situation in the waters off Somalia was beyond the coast guard's capabilities.³⁶ In addition, although the DPJ allowed a North Korean ship inspection bill to die in the legislative session just before the August 2009 election, the new policy paper states that the DPJ will take firm actions against North Korea, including ship inspections under UN Security Council resolutions.

On official development assistance (ODA) and environmental issues including climate change, the recent election platform set out a vision emphasizing transnational cooperation on preserving the environment, halting desertification, ensuring assistance for refugees, providing poverty eradication, and protecting against infection. The DPJ now identifies human security as "the most important objective of Japan's international cooperation."

³³ See "Senkyo: Shuinsen, shuyo roku seito: Toshu toronkai." The three non-nuclear principles have previously been spelled out in government statements and a parliamentary resolution but not passed into law by a parliamentary bill.

³⁴ "Hatoyama daihyo, shudanteki jieikenkoshi no kempo kaishaku hitei" [President Hatoyama Denied Constitutional Revision for the Exercise of Collective Self-defense], *Sankei Shimbun*, August 4, 2009, <http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20090804-00000631-san-pol>.

³⁵ "Hatoyama daihyo, shudanteki jieikenkoshi no kempo kaishaku hitei."

³⁶ "Senkyo: Shuinsen, shuyo roku seito: Toshu toronkai."

The new policy paper highlights the importance of aid to Africa and increasing support to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. The DPJ 2005 election platform called for a “fundamental review of ODA” to increase transparency and effectiveness through disclosure of information and conducting external audits. Though the 2009 election platform also mentions a “fundamental review,” it is clear that the DPJ is moving beyond criticism of the LDP on this issue.

The 2009 policy index also went further in promising that the DPJ would take leadership in international negotiations on climate change to encourage major greenhouse gas emitters such as China, the United States, and India to participate in the post-Kyoto Protocol agreement. For its part, the DPJ said Japan would actively engage in “environmental diplomacy” by transferring green technologies to developing countries and investing in environmental improvements via ODA.

Overall, there was an injection of pragmatism into DPJ foreign policy statements leading up to the August 30, 2009, election. The DPJ positioned itself to make few changes on foreign policy so as to focus on economic issues and not upset its Upper House coalition. The DPJ observed its advantage in the polls ahead of the election and adopted a strategy of sounding as moderate as possible to reassure independent voters and prevent LDP charges of reckless inexperience from sticking. Most notably for Washington, the campaigning DPJ leadership prioritized working with the Obama administration over pursuing its traditional objections to U.S. foreign policies. At the same time, the DPJ leadership continues to reassure the party’s left-leaning partners, especially the Social Democrats, of earlier positions on the Indian Ocean refueling mission, collective self-defense, and nuclear disarmament.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE

An assessment of policy documents and public statements supplemented by policymaker interviews uncovered five major foreign and security policy visions within the DPJ: (1) pursue a more mature Japan-U.S. alliance in which Japan is less dependent on and less deferential to the United States, (2) re-establish Japan as a member of Asia through economic and trade initiatives, historical reconciliation, and multilateral institution-building, (3) contribute to international security through the UN with Japan providing financing, peacekeepers, and impetus for reform, (4) working for nuclear disarmament via international and regional strategies (e.g., the NPT and six-party talks)

and Japanese diplomatic efforts, including with the United States, and (5) modernize Japan's national security apparatus to prioritize citizen rights and taxpayer savings even while responding to post-Cold War threats.

The foreign policy visions examined in this paper are generally shared by members of the DPJ, although no one vision enjoys unanimous support and different party leaders champion different visions as demonstrated above. Also, these foreign policy visions are not unique to the DPJ: for example, some members of the LDP share the vision of a more equal alliance, members of the New Komeito generally share the zeal for nuclear disarmament, and members of the Communist Party would like Japan to be more oriented toward Asia. In other words, the DPJ does not have a monopoly on any of these visions, but this particular combination of visions defines DPJ foreign policy as currently proposed.

Unpacking these visions was an important exercise because confusion, misperception, and even suspicion exist on where the DPJ will steer Japan's foreign and security policy. Foreign policy visions within the LDP are much better known and understood because LDP positions have been revealed by a history of public analysis and through the tests of governing. How DPJ foreign policy visions actually translate into policy will not be well understood until the party faces the tests of governing. That said, the following are likely points of departure from the long-ruling LDP's foreign policy:

- *Limiting the scope of the Japan-U.S. alliance.* A DPJ government will almost certainly maintain the alliance with United States but may try to modify plans for alliance transformation and revise down the LDP goal of a global security partnership with the United States to the traditional alliance scope of Japan's defense and regional stability.
- *Increasing efforts with the UN and Asian neighbors.* DPJ foreign policy may increase attention and focus on UN efforts and agencies for addressing global problems as well as seek Asian solutions for Asian problems by increasing coordination with neighboring countries on regional challenges. Though the specifics and probability of success for such efforts are uncertain, the DPJ has a clear desire to increase the weight of these priorities relative to cooperation with the United States. The DPJ may be less constrained by historical issues (*rekishi mondai*) in engaging Asian neighbors, but South Korea and Southeast Asian countries would have concerns about any DPJ policies that reduce the credibility of the U.S. military presence in the region.
- *More constraints on military deployment.* A DPJ government will likely require overseas deployment of the JSDF to pass through the veto gates of constitutional limitations, UN endorsement or international legitimacy, and Diet approval. The LDP put Japan on a path of

loosening such constraints. Though JSDF deployment under a DPJ government will be possible, overseas operations will likely be less significant and take longer to approve.

Given these expected policies, a best-case scenario from the perspective of those who advocate a more globally active U.S.-Japan alliance is unlikely as the DPJ comes to power. Domestic debate to build public support for Japan's international role is positive, but it remains counter to Japanese and U.S. national interests for the alliance to fall victim to political paralysis or become a political football. The hope of alliance managers in Washington and Tokyo was that the August 30, 2009, election would remove the deadlock in Japanese politics and allow U.S.-Japan cooperation to build from the high level achieved during the Bush-Koizumi years. Yet in the process of differentiating the DPJ from the LDP and taking political advantage of the unpopularity of the Bush administration's foreign policy, the DPJ made promises to the Japanese public. The new DPJ government will likely follow through on at least some of the positions above so as not to lose credibility with the public when taking control of the government for the first time.

On the other hand, alliance managers' worst-case scenario for U.S.-Japan relations is also improbable. The DPJ will certainly keep the alliance with the U.S. and continue Tokyo's official welcome for U.S. forces on Japanese soil. It is possible, however, that the DPJ government will push for changes in the U.S. military footprint beyond what is currently planned and seek significant changes to the existing alliance transformation blueprint. In that case, the United States may object vociferously, prompting the DPJ to become more antagonistic and leaving the alliance significantly strained. Concern for the trajectory of the alliance is thus justified, and yet there are three important factors to temper those concerns.

First, while running against the foreign policies of Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush may have won the DPJ political points at home, now the party actually has to govern. Japan's national security calls for close cooperation with the United States, and since President Bush has left the stage and President Obama is winding down the U.S. deployment in Iraq, the DPJ may act much more positively toward the United States when governing than when in opposition.

Second, the DPJ is seen by many Japanese to have a limited mandate to focus on economic and government reform issues. If the DPJ were to take steps that strain the alliance, the LDP, Japanese bureaucracy, the Japanese media, the Obama administration, and even the Japanese public may harshly criticize the

DPJ and demand that U.S.-Japan relations remain solid to deal with priorities ranging from the global economic recession to an aggressive North Korea.

Third, the tight election cycle will constrain the DPJ. An Upper House election is due in July 2010, and this could become a double election with the Lower House. The fact that the DPJ lacks a majority in the Upper House forces party leaders to listen to other smaller parties such as the Social Democratic Party and the People's New Party, at least until the next Upper House election in 2010. Moreover, given the current public distrust of governance in Japan, the daunting economic situation, and the fact that everyone is closely watching the untested DPJ, the new government will be wary of falling out of favor in the short amount of time before the next election.

Given the improbability of best- and worst-case scenarios, what does a middle way look like from the perspective of alliance managers? The DPJ may make some largely symbolic changes (e.g., allowing the JMSDF Indian Ocean mission to expire) and offer rhetoric but not significant movement on others (i.e., Okinawa and Guam). Under the cover that Obama is not Bush, the DPJ could express a greater desire to work with the Obama administration and essentially declare a "more equal partnership" with little substantial adjustment or cost. The DPJ may take some actions to satisfy the party's foreign policy constituency without challenging existing agreements in ways that would exceed U.S. tolerance. This would also allow the DPJ to reserve most of the new government's time, energy, and political capital to focus on economic and domestic issues. U.S.-Japan security cooperation would not be significantly disrupted, although alliance progress on force realignment and global contributions may remain slow.

Admittedly, the range of outcomes in this middle scenario is wide. Just how favorable or unfavorable the advent of a DPJ government will be for the alliance depends on several open questions:

- What contribution will Japan make to coalition efforts in Afghanistan?
- How much continuity will there be with exiting Security Consultative Committee (SCC) statements, i.e., how will the DPJ modify the Japanese vision of alliance transformation? How will this affect long-term strategic planning in both capitals?
- If Tokyo demands that the Futenma base relocation agreement be renegotiated, will this cause the whole alliance transformation plan to fall apart? Or do options on Futenma need to be considered in order to save the overall transformation package?

- How will the new Japanese government's management of nontraditional security issues (via economic and environmental diplomacy) affect the political support for the military alliance in both capitals?

Also at issue will be the ability of the DPJ to represent different ideas among its members and maintain party unity. It will be important to watch for the movement of factions and coalitions in the post-election political landscape.

In handing the DPJ a historic victory in the August 30, 2009, election, the Japanese public opted for a moderately different foreign and security policy, but not one radically different from that long established by the LDP. Not only will the DPJ face external, logistical, and bureaucratic challenges to making big changes to LDP policy, but the changes will likely be more in style than in substance. Moreover, the DPJ must immediately be concerned with the next election, which will demand demonstrated progress on economic and social issues more than demonstrated adjustments to foreign policy. Therefore, drastic changes to Japanese security policy are unlikely, but the August 2009 election can be considered a milestone—marking the point at which inter-party politics became one of the major factors of Japan's international relations. Moving forward, both U.S. and Japanese alliance managers will need to devote more attention to understanding views of the opposition party in the other country for the sake of alliance stability and increasing cooperation. ◆