Book from the People's Liberation Army Conference
Assessing the PLA’s Strengths and Weaknesses for Achieving the PRC’s Goals
The book will be released in late May.
This chapter examines the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) within the context of its modernization process and argues that the persistence of shortcomings may undercut the confidence senior leaders would prefer to have before deciding to initiate major combat.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
MAIN ARGUMENT
Over the past decade, the PLA has significantly increased the capabilities of its services in all domains of war, providing China’s leaders with new military options to defend the country’s national interests. However, based on problems in its combined arms and joint warfighting capabilities, leadership, and political loyalty, senior PLA leaders foresee decades of work before the PLA considers itself a modern, world-class military confident in its ability to conduct advanced, system-of-systems warfare. Despite the numerous improvements in equipment and organization, the PLA perceives itself as trailing the world leaders in many aspects of military technology, racing against time while its opponents are not slowing down. Even though the PLA may be required to fight at any moment, its leaders would prefer to stick to their modernization schedule ending in 2049 and achieve the nation’s goals through efforts short of war.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
- Evaluating Chinese reports of the PLA’s weaknesses is difficult because they are subjective rather than objective and measurable.
- Underestimating PLA capabilities is dangerous, but overestimating the pace and effectiveness of PLA modernization could lead to policies that cause China to increase the speed and scope of its efforts, resulting in an escalatory spiral or arms race.
- The PLA’s self-assessments of its capabilities should be compared with both the actions it undertakes and the potential options it refrains from taking.
- When interacting publicly with foreigners, Chinese leaders will not display doubts about PLA capabilities to “fight and win.”
Dennis J. Blasko is a retired Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, with 23 years of service as a military intelligence officer and Foreign Area Officer specializing in China.
Rick Gunnell is the Research Professor of China Military Studies in the U.S. Army War College’s China Landpower Studies Center.
This chapter represents only the views of the authors and not those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. The authors thank Jordan Shaw for research assistance and Brian Waidelich for comments.