Pakistani Partnerships with the United States: An Assessment
Daniel Markey
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Executive Summary
This essay assesses the relationships between the U.S. and different elements within Pakistan’s political and military leadership in the context of ongoing regional counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts.
Main Argument
- Since anti-American sentiment is widespread in Pakistan, political and military leaders tend to justify partnership with the U.S. as a necessary evil rather than a positive good.
- Pakistan’s military is conflicted in its partnership with the U.S., in part because of doubts about whether U.S. and Pakistani strategic interests are aligned, and in part because the Pakistani military lacks a robust, effective capacity to tackle the insurgents and terrorists that the U.S. perceives to be the greatest threat to regional and international security.
- Given the political fragility of the ruling coalition government in Islamabad, it is important to note that Pakistan’s other political party leaders, including former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, range widely in their support for cooperation with the U.S.
- Islamist parties stand no chance of winning national power through the ballot box, but in certain instances they may prove to be the only U.S. conduit for effective, albeit limited, counterterrorism cooperation.
Policy Implications
- Expanding technical assistance to civilian institutions and political parties in Pakistan may help to solidify Pakistan’s civilian democracy and avoid a return to military rule.
- Reaching out to different political parties, including those with limited regional constituencies, may offer a means to enhance U.S.-Pakistan cooperation at the subnational level.
- Undertaking several major assistance programs that provide high-profile demonstrations of U.S. partnership and meet serious development needs could help to mitigate anti-Americanism in Pakistan.
- Offering Pakistan’s military and intelligence the platforms, tools, and training appropriate to counterinsurgency operations has the potential to induce deeper cooperation with the U.S.