

BOOK REVIEW ROUNDTABLE

Recent Books on Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

Aqil Shah's

The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan

Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014

ISBN: 978-0-67-472893-6 (hardcover)

T.V. Paul's

The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World

New York: Oxford University Press, 2014

ISBN: 978-0-19-932223-7 (hardcover)

C. Christine Fair's

Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War

New York: Oxford University Press, 2014

ISBN: 978-0-19-989270-9 (hardcover)



John H. Gill

Marvin G. Weinbaum

Hasan Askari Rizvi

Aqil Shah

T.V. Paul

C. Christine Fair

Getting beyond Opacity: New Light on Pakistan's Enigmatic Army

John H. Gill

The Pakistan Army is one of the largest ground forces in the contemporary world. It is also arguably one of the most important military institutions in Asia and the neighboring Persian Gulf region. Factors contributing to the Pakistan Army's significance include its role in the near-term future of Afghanistan and in the stability of Pakistan itself, its long history of conflict with India, its predominant position in Pakistan's premier national intelligence agency, and its management of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. The Pakistan Army has also been the deciding voice in the country's most sensitive foreign relations, has ruled Pakistan for more than half of the country's existence, and has been the most powerful actor on the domestic political scene even when a general has not been serving as president. Yet despite its importance, this army remains largely opaque, little studied, and poorly understood, even within Pakistan.

A key reason for our limited knowledge is the wall of secrecy that the army assiduously maintains to protect its image. The near-total absence of archival material is one result of the army's information policies. Hard data is rare and researchers are left to sift through interviews, personal experiences, and the military's limited range of publications in search of deeper understanding. Despite these daunting research challenges, a growing number of scholars have attempted to penetrate the army's armor in recent years. The three works under consideration here are valuable additions to this encouraging trend at both the theoretical and empirical levels.¹

Although all three draw heavily on Pakistan's history, these are not military histories per se. Rather they are analyses of the army as an institution and its interaction with the Pakistani state, society, and foreign policy, especially with regard to India, Afghanistan, the United States, and, to a lesser degree, China. Several key features are worth noting at the outset. First, all three authors place their analyses in helpfully explanatory

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NOTE ~ The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not represent the policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

¹ For a review essay of other books on the Pakistan Army, see my article "Glimpses Inside Pakistan's Elusive Army," *Journal of Military History* 77, no. 1 (2013): 294–98.

theoretical frameworks. T.V. Paul takes an international relations approach to examine Pakistan as a “warrior state” with a “Hobbesian, hyper-realpolitik” worldview and suffering a “geographic curse” analogous to the “resource curse” that distorts development in other parts of the world. He contrasts Pakistan’s status with that of “war-making” European countries and erstwhile military-ruled Asian and African states that he sees as benefiting from the global economy and moving toward democracy or at least some form of greater political inclusion. While Paul asks why Pakistan has remained on a garrison state trajectory when other states have changed course, C. Christine Fair interrogates the Pakistan Army’s publications to explicate the state’s persistently “revisionist” behavior. “Revisionism,” in her terminology, goes well beyond the territorial dispute over Kashmir to embrace a far more ambitious goal of “holding India back” to maintain some kind of permanent parity with its much larger neighbor. She thus argues that Pakistan’s “revisionism” is driven more by ideology than security and asks why Pakistan has continued on this path when its efforts over the past six decades have yielded only negative consequences for its own fortunes. Aqil Shah’s analysis is more focused on Pakistan’s domestic political structure, probing the army’s tenacious dominance of state power when many other countries have moved away from authoritarian military regimes over the past two decades.

The theoretical frameworks these authors have selected allow them to offer comprehensive and fresh assessments of Pakistan and its armed forces. Their analyses are buttressed by utilization of untapped source material. All three draw on interviews and standard secondary works, but Fair and Shah in particular exploit essays, monographs, and magazines published by the Pakistani military. Fully cognizant of the limitations of these writings, both authors are judicious in using this body of literature to extract new insights and describe the army’s institutional attitudes and preferences. There is thus a new and most welcome avenue of approach to penetrating the obscurity surrounding Pakistan’s military.

The individual virtues of these books are too numerous to detail in a brief review, but a number of policy-relevant commonalities emerge when we consider these fine works in the aggregate. The importance of the ideological component that is central to Fair’s analysis, for instance, also features in Paul’s book. While Paul observes that states with “extreme ideological or realpolitik goals have not fared well” (p. 3), Fair contends that the Pakistani military, and thus the state, is not a traditional “security-seeking” international actor as is usually assumed. Rather, its policies are propelled

by an ideology founded on an existential, civilizational, and apparently interminable struggle with India (pp. 4–7). Frustrating India can thus become a goal in and of itself. Viewed through this lens, more or better weapons from outside sources or explicit external security guarantees will not satisfy Pakistan; indeed, such actions by other powers only contribute to sustaining dangerous Pakistani behavior. This concern is closely related to another commonality between Fair and Paul: what they see as Pakistan’s enduring quest for strategic parity with India. “Parity,” in this case, is not confined to military terms of tanks, ships, planes, and warheads but embraces a larger spectrum of status on the international stage and “nondiscriminatory” treatment by outside actors, among other objectives.² Indeed, Fair argues that the Pakistan Army defines success or victory as the ability to preclude India’s “regional ascendancy” (p. 279), while Paul points to the obvious discrepancy between ends and means in this quest (p. 157).

There are also important commonalities among these books on the domestic front. Both Shah and Fair, for example, stress the development and consequences of the army’s dominance of civilian institutions. Shah cites what he calls the army’s tutelary beliefs and norms, its paternalistic attitudes, and the lingering drag of the inherited viceregal system as “democratically corrosive” (p. 49), underwriting the prevalence of authoritarian rule and the steady erosion of civilian institutions. On a related note, Shah, Paul, and Fair all comment on the persistence of British-era notions of “martial races” in the Pakistan Army. These residual assumptions not only color the military’s views of its own population as a source of recruits; they also often function as a filter for interpreting the outside world, especially by applying a negative tint to India and Afghanistan as possible foes.

Finally, all three authors agree on two broad points. First, they are sharply critical of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Pakistan. All see U.S. policies as tolerating or permitting dangerous and self-destructive behavior by Pakistan and its armed forces. In Fair’s view, for example, U.S. largesse or naiveté not only enables but encourages Pakistan to avoid confronting its multiple domestic problems (e.g., the dismal economy) and to play a destabilizing spoiler role regionally (p. 281). Second, all three grimly conclude that the prospects for favorable changes in the trajectory of Pakistan’s internal development or external behavior are small. Shah is especially detailed in his discussion of what would need to change to induce a significant shift in

² See also Aparna Pande, *Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).

Pakistan's future evolution, but none of the authors express any hope that such dramatic changes are likely in the near to medium term.

There are, of course, several areas that would have benefited from somewhat more explicit investigation. The army's obsession with image is one. In what ways does this influence its domestic and international behavior? Fair alludes to this phenomenon in her work, but more specific analysis would have been illuminating.³ Similarly, Paul mentions the value the Pakistan Army attaches to "tying down India," but this notion could be expanded with additional analysis.⁴ The argument could be made, for example, that Kashmir is an issue not only for emotive and historical reasons, but also because it serves what one might term "instrumental" purposes. That is, if Pakistani leaders are genuinely convinced that India is intent on Pakistan's destruction (as Fair argues), and if they truly believe that India has committed up to 800,000 "troops" in the disputed region (as stated in an October 2014 newspaper editorial), then the outside observer could conclude that militancy and terrorism in Kashmir serve an instrumental purpose in nailing the Indian Army in place.⁵ An otherwise supposedly inevitable attack is thus forestalled.

As for the individual books, it would have been interesting to see Fair and Paul examine how the Pakistan Army defines concepts such as "friends" and "interests" in the international context. Fair approaches this in her review of the army's hagiographic treatment of China as compared with the generally vitriolic rhetoric reserved for the United States, and Paul touches on this issue when he depicts Pakistan as viewing the world through a Hobbesian prism. But it would have been enlightening if they had carried this line of thinking a few steps further. Shah, on the other hand, may be too critical of the army in some of its recent interactions with the civilian elements of the state. The former chief of staff of the Pakistan army, General Ashfaq Kayani, for one, allegedly tried but failed to elicit strategic guidance from the civilian leadership. Having cleared and held zones of militancy such as Swat, the army may also legitimately complain that civilian authorities are conspicuous by their absence when the time comes for the military to withdraw. Furthermore, the army is the object of

³ See A.R. Siddiqi, *The Military in Pakistan: Image and Reality* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1996).

⁴ For instance, citing the former chief of the Pakistan Army, General Aslam Beg, Paul touches on the notion of the Indian Army being overcommitted in Kashmir (p. 111), but he does not elaborate on this important nuance.

⁵ "The Million March," *News International* (Pakistan), October 28, 2014. In addition to exaggerating overall numbers, such figures conflate police and paramilitary forces with regular army units and thus misrepresent the Indian Army's involvement.

urgent importunities by groups across the political spectrum whenever a domestic crisis arises. For example, Shah might have explicitly addressed the thorny issues associated with the army's role—if any—when elected officials undermine the political system through corruption, ineptitude, or megalomaniac behavior. Breaking out of this destructive cycle requires civil as well as military vision and steadfastness.

These lacunae and desiderata notwithstanding, all three works are excellent additions to the growing scholarship on Pakistan and its army. Policy-relevant and academically rigorous, thoughtful and readable, they can be recommended highly for decision-makers, staffers, and analysts in the policy, security, and intelligence communities. They will be especially valuable for diplomats and military officers assigned to serve in Pakistan or with Pakistani armed forces.

The Normative Underpinnings of Pakistan's Military

Marvin G. Weinbaum

The number of books devoted to the study of Pakistan's military continues to grow, and with good reason. Any understanding of Pakistan's foreign and security policy begins with an appreciation of the role played by the country's premier political institution, the army. The volumes by C. Christine Fair, T.V. Paul, and Aqil Shah add richly to the literature on the army and militarism in Pakistan. As in other studies, the preoccupation of Pakistan's military with the perceived threat of India looms large in the authors' analyses. The adversarial nature of civil-military relations and the military's mercurial relations with the United States are also familiar themes. These three books stand apart, however, in the weight given to strategic culture in forming attitudes and behavior within Pakistan's military. Fair finds the army's ideology and mentality necessary for explaining the biases in Pakistan's foreign policy. Shah focuses on those beliefs and mindsets in the army that lead to its repeated interventions against civilian authority. Paul shows how the military's thinking, particularly about India, has prevented the country from emerging as a development-oriented state and has instead turned it into a garrison state.

While employing a similar normative approach, the books frame their analyses around different leading questions. Fair asks why after almost seven decades Pakistan has been unable to accommodate itself to India's regional preeminence and has stayed committed to a revisionist foreign policy regarding Kashmir, despite the detrimental consequences. She finds the answer in Pakistan's apprehensions about its larger neighbor that are driven more by ideology than security. It is a military fixed on an image of India as an aggressive power whose aim is to dominate Pakistan and the South Asian region. Fair describes a military that uses Pakistan's founding national ideology, Islam, to unify the country against India's supposed existential threat.

Paul is most concerned about why Pakistan has remained a security state and has failed to move toward becoming a sustainable democracy. After explaining the historical and sociological reasons behind this failure, he argues that in large part what perpetuates military dominance

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is war preparation that has siphoned off the country's scarce resources and distracted its citizens from demanding economic and social reforms. Paul points to the state's execution of U.S regional strategic objectives in return for aid as having disincentivized the political elite from taking the route to sustainable economic growth and political reform.

Shah explores why the military has repeatedly intervened in the country's political affairs. Drawing on historical evidence, he traces the expansion of authoritarianism to nation-building problems and the conception of members of the army's higher officer corps about the appropriate institutional role of the military in national security, governance, and democracy. Shah finds that the perceived security threat from India, coupled with ethnic and linguistic cleavages during Pakistan's formative years, led to the military's rapid modernization and development at the cost of economic growth and civil-institution building. Periods of instability under civilian rule strengthened the army's belief in itself as the protector of the state against external threats, ethnic fragmentation, and incompetent and corrupt politicians.

In the best sense, these are academic books. They ground their analyses solidly within the political science literature and international relations theory. All three books provide deep historical context and single out the importance of political events in the shaping of the military's frame of mind. Largely free of jargon, they are written for both a well-informed and general readership. Methodologically, there are commonalities. Fair and Shah are particularly interested in what the military says about itself as recorded in its own publications and through interviews. Both authors use these materials effectively to illustrate their conclusions. Shah and particularly Paul draw instructive comparisons with other states that have had greater success in the transition away from military supremacy toward the consolidation of democracy.

The three authors describe the frequently close collaboration of the military with Islamic extremist groups. Paul discusses the role of Islam in shaping the Pakistani elites' mindsets and identifies the attachment to radical Islamic thinking among many military officers. Fair notes the infiltration of the army by Islamic militants and discusses how the army has sought to use Islam to create unity both within its ranks and within society. In Shah's concern with the proper balance between the military and civil authority, he observes that their relationship affects not only Pakistan's custodial responsibilities for nuclear weapons but also how it addresses extremist groups.

Yet none of the books cast much light on the interactions between the military and extremist groups. Curiously missing is any discussion about how those values and beliefs associated with Islamic groups may have contributed to forming the military's thinking, including policies toward India, Afghanistan, and the West. Nor do any of the authors examine closely how the normative biases of the military may help explain its differential policies toward these extremist groups, both those that collaborate with the state and those that oppose it.

In other areas, much of the time Paul conflates the military and political-bureaucratic elites and thus fails to recognize the divergence of their interests. Elsewhere he asserts that U.S. policymakers have never seen a democratic Pakistan as feasible or desirable, when it would be more accurate to say that the United States' security interests during the Cold War and since September 11 have dictated that it work with the military and not prioritize democracy. Also, Paul vastly overstates the aspirations of Pakistan's Pashtuns for the creation of an independent state. And his assertions that the Pakistani Taliban have at one point held 30% of the country (p. 63) or that Barelvis constitute only 15% of the population (p. 130) are open to challenge.

Fair highlights the military's acting as a revisionist institution. But while that may accurately portray its foreign-policy agenda, domestically it is very much a status quo institution. More attention might have been devoted to how the two orientations directly reinforce each other. Fair also might have given greater consideration to how the military's strategic thinking in an era of numerous media outlets and social media is influenced by the very public attitudes it has contributed to forming. Although Fair provides an extended discussion of Pakistan's pursuit of strategic depth, she too readily dismisses Shuja Nawaz's contention that Pakistan's policy elite's views on strategic depth have evolved (see p. 134). The military's years of trying to manage the Afghan Taliban and before them the *mujahideen* parties have made it far more aware of the limits of its ability to shape outcomes in Afghanistan. Military planners cannot view the prospect of a victorious Taliban in the same way as in the 1990s, when Pakistan did not have an Islamic insurgency of its own to worry about. While there are undoubtedly elements of Pakistan's intelligence services still intent on trying to implant a compliant Afghanistan regime, the strategic thinking among most policymakers seems mainly to ensure that future regimes in Kabul will not be unfriendly and deeply dependent on India.

All the authors discuss the potential for reform. They describe a state that in its struggle to achieve national unity and security has from the outset subordinated society's needs to security and retarded economic and political development. Each recognizes how the army through repeated coups and periods of rule is responsible for deepening Pakistan's structural problems and has impeded efforts to reach solutions through political and especially democratic processes. None of the authors foresee a sharp break from those underlying norms, particularly regarding India, that form so much of Pakistan's strategic culture and that create, in Paul's terms, a warrior state. Nor do any expect to witness far-reaching domestic reforms or an improved view within the military of Pakistan's political class anytime soon.

Yet Paul does not entirely rule out progress toward reform. Looking comparatively, he points out that some states have managed to maintain a high but not excessive level of military preparation while also providing increased public goods for their citizens. Shah recognizes the possibility that an elected government through performance that meets public expectations might in time weaken the military's ascendance. He alone among the authors has specific recommendations for reforms in civil-military relations that would strengthen civilian control over the armed forces. Fair, clearly the least optimistic, sees no way to escape the military's grip.

These are outstanding books that complement one another. Taken together, they offer an exceptional in-depth look into the psyche of Pakistan's military. The three authors provide a fuller understanding of those values and beliefs that contribute to explaining the military's obsession with India, its long ambivalence about political extremism, and its regular interventions in civilian affairs. Above all, the authors have demonstrated the pervasive influence of the military's strategic culture in the formation of so many of contemporary Pakistan's aspirations as well as problems.

The Military and Pakistan's Political and Security Disposition

Hasan Askari Rizvi

The military is the most formidable political player in Pakistan. The long years of direct and indirect rule have given enough experience and confidence to the military to overshadow core political institutions and processes even when it stays in the barracks. It retains professional skills, organizational capacity, discipline, and determination to set aside civilian processes through direct intervention. However, the military's preference since 2008 is for exercising political clout from the sidelines for reasons beyond the scope of this review essay. This has given some space to civilian leadership to function in a relatively autonomous manner. The military periodically builds pressure on the civilian government by publicly disagreeing on policy matters, encouraging the political opposition to become more active, forcing a change in civilian political power arrangements, or exercising strong influence in the policy areas of its choice.

Pakistan's drift from a civilian political system to a military-dominated political order and the implications of this change for the Pakistani state and society, as well as for the country's foreign and security policies, have drawn the attention of academics and political analysts. Four factors explain this interest: Pakistan's perennial conflicts with India, its active cooperation with the United States and conservative Arab states to build up Afghan-Islamic resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979–89), Pakistan's role in the U.S.-led war against terrorism, and its use of Islamic militant groups as an instrument of foreign policy.

The three books under review—*The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan* by Aqil Shah, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War* by C. Christine Fair, and *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* by T.V. Paul—are the latest additions to the literature on Pakistan. All three books show a strong focus on the Pakistani military as a state institution, its ascendancy to power, its dominance of internal political and societal processes, and the formulation of Pakistan's security and foreign policy profile.

Aqil Shah has contributed the most current and comprehensive study to the literature on civil-military relations in Pakistan. *The Army and Democracy* combines an analysis of hard historical data with a consideration

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of the major theoretical formulations about different facets of civil-military relations and the experiences of several developing countries. This approach enables Shah to assess the dynamics of the Pakistani military's ascendancy to power, the problems of different military regimes, the means by which these regimes seek to craft political systems that ensure the continuity of the military's tutelary role, and the impact of military dominance on Pakistan's internal political choices, foreign policy, and security disposition over the years.

Shah also examines the gradual degeneration and decay of political and societal processes in Pakistan. He identifies the country's perceived security threats, the inability of civilian and military regimes to ensure meaningful political participation and socioeconomic equity for different ethnic and regional groups, and the unnecessary delay in the framing of a democratic constitutional political order as the main causes of this downward trend. Shah discusses how the Zia and Musharraf regimes strengthened the military's tutelary role and also analyzes the interaction between various civilian rulers and the top military brass.

While acknowledging the explanations given by other writers for the Pakistani military's rise to power and expanded role in civilian sectors, Shah focuses on the mindset, orientations, and disposition of the military officers as the principal causes. The critical factor in his view is how the officers articulate their role and self-image as well as their perception of civilian leaders and political processes. According to Shah, officers learn all this through their education, training, and service socialization. He argues that the key issue is whether "they perceive democratic institutions as inherently or as conditionally legitimate" (p. 8). His response is that the training curricula, professional journals, and socialization of the military in Pakistan reinforce the guardian and tutelary role of the officers and create a negative view of civilian politics.

In order to understand the critical role of the military's mindset, it would have been helpful for Shah to compare the formation of the Pakistani military's mentality with similar processes in the countries where the military accepts the primacy of democratic politics. A comparison with India, for example, would have been especially useful. The military has a strong tendency to sustain its privileged position once it tastes political power and entrenches itself in civilian sectors. There is hardly any chance of the military voluntarily accepting civilian primacy unless the political and societal dynamics and security considerations force military leaders to

review their disposition or change their strategies for holding on to their expanded role.

C. Christine Fair's *Fighting to the End* is another comprehensive study of the Pakistani army. It breaks new ground in its analysis of how the army constructs and sustains Pakistan's security profile and marginalizes the civilian political leadership. No writer has so far made such an extensive use of Pakistani military publications like the *Army Journal*, *Hilal*, and various issues of the *Green Book*, in addition to the courses of study and reports on security issues prepared by officers at the military training institutions. *Fighting to the End* draws on these articles and commentaries to understand the army's worldview, especially its perceptions of security challenges and how to cope with them. A number of security notions entertained by the military have also been traced back to these publications. These include Pakistan's strategic culture, threats from India and Afghanistan, the use of nonstate Islamic militants as an instrument of foreign and security policies, and strategic depth, which has multiple meanings and is often raised in the context of Pakistan's security interaction with Afghanistan. All this is discussed against the backdrop of an overview of Pakistan's independence movement, the partition of British India in 1947, the division of the British Indian military between the independent states of India and Pakistan, and the Kashmir issue. Fair's basic argument is that Pakistan's worldview and strategic culture impel the army to threaten India, adopt an interventionist approach in Afghanistan, and pursue a dual-track policy toward the United States. She maintains that Pakistan's confrontation with India is "more ideological than security driven" and that Pakistan does not simply want to grab Kashmir but also wants to "undermine India's position in the region and beyond" (p. 4). As a result, Fair advises the international community, especially the United States, not to adopt a policy of appeasement toward Pakistan because this would not stop the army from its "revisionist pursuits."

Whether Pakistan is a "persistent revisionist," as argued by Fair, or a country seeking autonomy of action in India-dominated South Asia is a matter of interpretation. Further, with the introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia in 1998, one wonders if the notion of strategic depth is relevant for Pakistan's security today.

The Pakistani state and its military identified with Islam from the beginning because Pakistan's establishment was a product of a new nationalism that challenged the secular, one-nation nationalism of the Congress Party. As an alternative nationalism, Pakistan's founders argued

that the Muslims of British India were a separate nation. It is thus not surprising that Pakistan's civilian and military institutions invoked Islam in the post-independence period. Islam and Islamic history and wars have been integral to the military's educational system from the beginning. However, it was only during General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's military regime (1977–88) that the military in general and the army in particular employed Islamic orthodoxy and adopted militancy as an instrument of foreign and security policy. The legacy of these years spilled over to the later period.

T.V. Paul's *The Warrior State* is another scholarly study of Pakistan that will evoke much academic interest. It describes the army and the military-dominated intelligence agencies as the main culprits for Pakistan's domestic failures and its aggressive profile at the regional and global levels. Paul maintains that Pakistan engages in a conflictual relationship and war with India, attempts to bring Afghanistan under its orbit, and misleads the United States on countering terrorism.

Focusing primarily on Pakistan's foreign policy and security disposition, the book can be described as belonging to the academic discourse on the present and the future of Pakistan. Some academics and political analysts, though recognizing the pitfalls in the country's handling of foreign policy and security affairs, maintain that Pakistan continues to be a resilient state and has an inherent capacity to bounce back. Others describe Pakistan as a failed or failing state that is not likely to overcome its internal and external problems. Paul's analysis in *The Warrior State* falls in the latter category. He appears to have adopted the position that Pakistan is a case of conspicuous failure with little or no hope for salvaging itself, even if the international community continues to provide economic assistance or some of the problems with India are resolved. Paul describes Pakistan in variously negative terms, including as a garrison state, a warrior state, and a paranoid and dysfunctional state that is at war with itself in its domestic context and engages in territorial conflicts and wars with other states, especially its neighbors. With respect to the latter description, he notes that Pakistan fields nonstate militant Islamic warriors as an instrument to advance its foreign policy agenda.

Paul uses political theory, historical data going back to the establishment of Pakistan and the post-independence security developments, and comparative data for several Asian and African countries to strengthen his argument that Pakistan is incapable of transforming itself into a proper democracy and development-oriented state. In this regard, *The Warrior*

State projects an alarmist view, creating a strong impression that the author has a predetermined view of Pakistan and interprets the data and history to provide an intellectual basis to his argument. The book hardly discusses any factor in the context of bilateral India-Pakistan relations, regional politics, or global affairs that could cause insecurity in Pakistan or adversely affect its interests.

Fair and Paul both describe Pakistan's revisionism and warrior disposition as threats to peace and stability at the regional and global levels. A diametrically opposite perspective, however, is articulated by a number of Pakistani political leaders and analysts with strong politically far-right and Islamist orientations. They argue that India and the United States want to undermine Pakistan because it is an Islamic state that possesses nuclear weapons, and they blame Pakistan's current problems on external factors. Perhaps the reality lies somewhere between these two extreme views.

The Greedy Warrior State

Aqil Shah

There has been a spate of books on Pakistan and its military in recent years. Of these, T.V. Paul's *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* and C. Christine Fair's *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War* stand out for their originality, theoretical elegance, and, especially in the latter case, empirical depth. Both authors deal with different, if related, aspects of the Pakistani state's anachronistic national security policies, which are defined by a gross mismatch between its capabilities and revisionist strategic goals vis-à-vis archrival India. Similarly, both stress the important role of elite strategic ideas or culture in shaping state security preferences. But whereas Paul locates the structural source of the country's maladies in its geopolitical location, Fair casts her analytical gaze at the military institutional level.

In the persuasive *Warrior State*, Paul seeks to explain why Pakistan remains an economically underdeveloped garrison state when former military-ruled states in Asia and Africa have embraced democracy and reaped the dividends of free trade and globalization (p. 2). The main culprits in his story are Pakistan's civilian and military elites. According to Paul, the ruling elite had both the motive (or what he calls a "hyper-realpolitik" ideology with a religious bent) and the opportunity (the territorial rivalry with India) to pursue a ruinous military-first approach to security at the cost of social and economic development, enabled by U.S. geostrategic rents that obviated the Pakistani military's need to pursue democracy or development (pp. 3, 5, 18, 28).

While these factors are well-known, Paul's key contribution lies in his thoughtful application of important social science theories to the Pakistani case. First, he draws on Charles Tilly's "war-making as state-making" thesis, namely the argument that the needs of warfighting forced Western European elites in the seventeenth century to strengthen the state's extractive capacity to raise standing armies. Hence, fighting other states should spur domestic development in other contexts as well. But when applied to the Pakistani context, warfare and national consolidation have been conflicting rather

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than complementary logics. As Paul rightly observes, the country's heavy investment in the military for over six decades has brought neither security nor prosperity. This paradoxical outcome leads him to infer that excessive war-making efforts can induce political and economic stagnation in developing contexts by diverting scarce resources from social welfare to defense (p. 2, 15, 157, 188–89). Citing the examples of the East Asian tigers South Korea and Taiwan, Paul contends that states can still harness the salutary effects of war on national development only if elites can “control or compartmentalize” it to achieve rapid economic growth (pp. 15, 175–80). Ultimately, and given the right strategic environment and resources, what matters most is whether elites are pragmatic or dogmatic. Unfortunately, in Paul's view, Pakistan's elites have been “devoid of prudence” (p. 3) and a “developmental outlook” (p. 5). Hence, they have opted for the unrestrained pursuit of narrow militarized security resulting in state weakness and economic decay (p. 15).

The book dismisses the conventional wisdom that the threat from India independently explains Pakistan's evolution into a garrison state. Instead, the author claims that the “policy choice to respond militarily was largely Pakistan's own” (p. 4). After all, as he reminds us, countries like Taiwan and South Korea faced “similar conflict situations,” but they never became obsessed with security and their elite adopted developmental state policies. Similarly, from his comparison of Pakistan with Turkey, Indonesia, and Egypt, Paul concludes that even Muslim-majority “national security” states have overcome the warrior urge because of smart choices by elites (pp. 152–75).

Here, claims in *The Warrior State* are contestable on several grounds. One, both South Korea and Taiwan enjoyed varying degrees of external security guarantees from the United States, so they had a better chance of prioritizing economics over warfare. Two, and unlike ethnically divided Pakistan, both South Korea and Taiwan were also homogenous societies, which ultimately facilitated their transitions to democracy by insulating them from the potential challenge of peacefully accommodating ethnic diversity. Finally, neither Turkey nor Indonesia was even half as insecure as Pakistan, and their main security threats were internal. Hence, as Paul himself concedes, neither had the need to overspend on defense or develop the tools, such as the use of nonstate actors, needed to fight a much stronger external enemy (p. 165).

Second, he attributes Pakistan's thwarted development to its geographic location, which has put a “geostrategic curse” on the country (pp. 3, 15, 21–22, 33). According to the book, this strategic curse works much like

the well-known curse of natural resources. In return for serving (and at times undermining) U.S. security interests, Pakistan's elites have enjoyed access to strategic rents, which has discouraged them from expanding the state's extractive capacity to achieve the economic strength required for maintaining the security competition with India (pp. 18–23).

This “rentier” thesis has much going for it but leaves one question unanswered: why did Pakistan not reform itself when the strategic rents dried up—for example, in 1965–80 and 1990–2001? Paul alludes to the path-dependent nature of ideas (p. 23), so it is reasonable to infer that even in the absence of U.S. military aid, Pakistani elites continued to harbor their hyper-realist strategic assumptions. However, it is not clear where these assumptions come from, or how they stick. On closer analysis, it appears more plausible that once Pakistan's founding fathers adopted a warrior state strategy in response to structural insecurity at the outset of independence, these Hobbesian beliefs developed a life of their own, especially because the powerful military institution internalized them.

Military beliefs and culture are where Fair also focuses her compelling argument in *Fighting to the End*. She is puzzled by Pakistan's persistent attempts to overturn the territorial status quo in Kashmir despite repeated failure in 1948, 1965, and 1999. No less baffling is the military's continuing reliance on violent nonstate actors (under the cover of nuclear weapons) to sustain the rivalry with India, a strategy that has eroded Pakistan's international standing, left it diplomatically isolated, and even posed a threat to its own survival as a state (pp. 227–32, 243–51).

This enduring revisionism leads Fair to wonder whether Pakistan really is a normal, security-seeking state. Realist international relations theory posits that all modern states are rational actors primarily concerned with achieving physical security. Rationality demands that states abandon or change policies that fail to achieve their objectives. Hence, the book argues that Pakistan may be what Charles Glaser calls a “purely greedy state,” which can never be satisfied with the status quo and will always try to aggrandize more territory or spread its ideology (pp. 4–5, 282). According to Fair, this greedy behavior endures primarily because the Pakistani military sees the conflict with India in “civilizational” terms and thus has never interpreted losing a war as defeat. Instead, victory means the ability to continue “fighting to the end” (p. 7).

What are the organizational sources of this strategy? Fair painstakingly combs through the Pakistani military's underutilized professional journals and publications over the last six decades to argue that its main driver is

military strategic culture—or taken-for-granted and shared conceptions of Pakistan’s external environment—which influences how the organization interprets the threats from India and Afghanistan and the instruments it has developed to tackle them (pp. 5–7, 34–38, 243). She convincingly traces the origins of this culture to the military’s formative experience and accumulated memory of perceived Indian perfidy during and after the partition of British India (pp. 40–65), and tracks its evolution and transmission over time. What emerges is a professional discourse replete with self-serving falsehoods and historical distortions, in which “Hindu” India is depicted as an implacable enemy and the army as the sole bulwark for protecting Pakistan’s physical and ideological frontiers (pp. 88–102; on the army’s perceptions of India as the malicious foe, see pp. 154–86). The Pakistani military’s recalcitrant conflict behavior is a damning confirmation of Fair’s thesis and provides strong evidence that norms are path dependent and difficult to change once they become ingrained in institutional structures.

What does this mean for the United States, India, and the international community? *Fighting to the End* contends that appeasing Pakistan by giving it security guarantees or other concessions is unlikely to work because the Pakistani military’s revisionism is driven by ideology rather than material insecurity (p. 282). Hence, the best the United States and its allies can do is to decide how to contain the threat of Islamist militancy and terrorism emanating from Pakistan (pp. 281–82).

How might Pakistan’s sticky strategic culture change? Fair is pessimistic about the prospects of any significant alterations as long as the military continues to view the conflict with India through a strictly ideological lens. She does consider several potential endogenous and exogenous game changers in the book’s penultimate chapter. For example, drawing on her earlier work with Shuja Nawaz, Fair argues that changes in the geographic distribution of the officer corps mean that the army is now recruiting officers with a different worldview from that of their seniors who came from select districts of the Punjab province (pp. 269–74). The salutary effect of broad-based recruitment on military attitudes faces one formidable obstacle, though: the military’s capacity to socialize recruits into institutionally sanctioned norms and ideas by creating a break with the past.

Fair is even less hopeful that political change, such as a successful democratization, can make a difference. In her view, an ossified strategic culture, based on erroneous assumptions, permeates the national narrative, is inserted into the education system and civil society, is not rational or

empirical, and remains resistant to amelioration (see p. 11 and p. 21). The implication is that even if the military were weaned away from dominating politics and strategic policy, civilian politicians would be unlikely to challenge the generals' strategic assumptions because they have "thoroughly acquiesced to this reality" (p. 21; see also p. 265).

However, Fair seems to discount the role of political learning on elite attitudes and behavior. As the case of Brazil and other Latin American countries demonstrates, the experience of authoritarian government can unite political elite against military praetorianism and electoral competition can create incentives for them to erode the military's undue political and strategic influence. Pakistan's most recent transition from authoritarian rule in 2007–8 has revealed that major political parties like the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) have learned their lessons from exile, incarceration, and repression under authoritarian rule and appear strongly committed to the democratic process. In May 2013, Pakistan broke its seemingly permanent curse of zero democratic turnover of power from one full-term elected government to another when the PPP government completed its five-year tenure and Nawaz Sharif's opposition PML-N won the parliamentary elections to form a new government. As Fair herself admits, this successful transition was made possible in good part by Sharif's ability to resist the temptation of knocking on the garrison's door to unseat the PPP government (p. 265). In addition, his decision to allow and pursue the trial of former president General Pervez Musharraf for treason under Article 6 of Pakistan's constitution will likely act as a further deterrent to military coups.

On the India front, Pakistan's politicians do not necessarily share the military's pessimistic view of India as a source of unremitting hostility. In fact, Sharif and Benazir Bhutto (especially in her first term from 1988 to 1990) sought to mend fences with New Delhi at significant political risk. For instance, Sharif's peace overture to India in 1999 irked Musharraf, then the army chief, who tried to scuttle it by sending troops into the Kargil sector of Indian Kashmir and ultimately overthrew Sharif in October of that year. To the military's chagrin, Sharif has sought to normalize trade with India since assuming power in 2013. Moreover, in three of Pakistan's four provinces—Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, and Baluchistan—the Kashmir issue is hardly a vote winner. And the fact that the PML-N's main base of support is in Punjab, Pakistan's largest and electorally most significant province, shows clearly that resolving the conflict with India has a sizable domestic constituency. The military still has influential allies

among political parties (e.g., Imran Khan's Tehreek-e-Insaf) and civil society (e.g., the media), which it can use to browbeat governments that it considers soft on India. But if the PPP, the PML-N, and other parties remain united around the goal of maintaining democracy, Pakistan's civil-military imbalance could shift in favor of the civilians, thereby increasing the likelihood that the country may forgo its revisionism and learn to live peacefully with India.

These minor flaws and disagreements aside, both *The Warrior State* and *Fighting to the End* are compelling in their own right. Both books should be standard reading for scholars and policymakers interested in understanding the India-Pakistan rivalry and the Pakistani military, as well as political development, terrorism, and security studies more broadly.

Culture or Structure? Understanding the Complexities of Pakistan

T. V. Paul

In recent years, Pakistan has received a fair amount of attention largely from journalists, think tank analysts, and a handful of writers from the scholarly community. After neglecting the paradoxes of this country for several decades, Western scholars have finally started to look at it more seriously. I suspect the reluctance to do hard-nosed analysis of Pakistan was probably due to its pivotal role for the United States during the Cold War and, since September 11, in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Despite academic freedom, Western scholars often implicitly follow the lead of their governments on such countries of strategic value. Liberal scholars also often tend to see Pakistan's struggles as imposed on it, blaming the lack of a solution to the Kashmir problem as the number one impediment to Pakistan's proper democratic transformation. Political correctness is a big challenge here. Pakistan's military and diplomatic communities have shown extraordinary dexterity in covering up their pet geopolitical projects in order to bargain for continued military and economic aid from the West and international financial institutions without undertaking necessary reforms. However, as U.S. policy toward India and Pakistan underwent some major changes in recent years, it now is easier to publish critical work on Pakistan. Washington no longer hyphenates the two and has started to give India the status of a rising major power. The "double games" that the Pakistani military has been playing in the war on terrorism have also created a sense in Washington that "enough is enough" in propping up Pakistan's military elite.

Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War by C. Christine Fair and *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan* by Aqil Shah offer useful pathways to understanding the Pakistani army's societal dominance and its persistent organizational and cultural pathologies. They follow works by Stephen Cohen (*The Idea of Pakistan*, 2004), Husain Haqqani (*Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 2005), and Shuja Nawaz (*Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 2008). Fair is more direct and critical of the Pakistani army, using the lens of a strategic culture approach. The key to understanding Pakistan's behavior, her book claims, lies in strategic culture, which encompasses "the collectivity of its corporate

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beliefs, values, and norms as well as the accumulating weight of its historical experiences” (p. 5). Fair argues that Pakistan’s apprehensions about India are driven more by ideology than security. This ideology is founded on an idea of undermining India’s dominant position within South Asia and beyond. Such behavior exhibits the traits of a “greedy state,” to paraphrase Charles Glaser, and it is unlikely to be placated by territorial revisions alone. The Pakistani army is defending not just territory but an ideological frontier founded on Islam. And this strategic culture is the basis for understanding the behavior of Pakistan toward India and Afghanistan, as well as its domestic politics, including the army’s domination over civilians on matters of foreign and defense policy.

Fighting to the End argues that Pakistan’s revisionism toward India needs to be understood beyond Kashmir. I agree with Fair on this point. It is naive to believe that somehow solving the Kashmir problem according to the established position of Pakistan will reduce the army’s role in the country. Let us look at the two solutions Pakistanis and Pakistan sympathizers talk about for Kashmir: independence and India ceding Kashmir to Pakistan. In the first instance, an independent Kashmir is likely to become a theater of intense violence (similar to Afghanistan) between Pakistan and India, and perhaps China, because of its strategic location. Over time, the Kashmiri liberation movements have become theocratic, and therein lies the problem. The substantial Hindu and Buddhist minorities are unlikely to be accommodated in such a new country. The jihadists waiting on Pakistan’s side will not let this hypothetically independent country become democratic, secular, or tolerant of minority groups. If India’s border post moves down to the precarious Punjab terrain, India will have to actively defend this border, preemptively or preventively. An emboldened Pakistani army will claim that it needs, more than ever, to strengthen its position vis-à-vis India and protect its ally, Kashmir. The option of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan is likely to play out in a similar fashion. India will find the Pakistani army on the border some four hundred miles from New Delhi, the traditional invasion route for the conquerors of the subcontinent for several millennia. The Pakistani army’s grand ambitions vis-à-vis India will increase, and there is no guarantee that its societal role will diminish in such a scenario. None of this is to sympathize with India’s often high-handed policy in Kashmir or Pakistan’s continuous policy of fomenting troubles with insurgents. The focus here is on the likely persistence of the Pakistani army’s dominant societal status even if the Kashmir problem were solved in Pakistan’s favor.

Fair is correct in arguing that the struggle by Pakistan is not about territory per se but about strategic parity with India. She does not use the term “status competition,” but that is the correct problem here. Because of cultural myths inherited over the years, the Pakistani army sees India now as a status-equivalent power, and earlier as a status-inferior state. The propping up of Pakistan by the great powers, especially the United States and China, has encouraged this exaggerated view. Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons to develop this equal status. Now that the great powers are changing their tune, the Pakistani military is in a very difficult situation. Its revisionist behavioral pathologies are likely to persist because it sees no end in sight for India’s increasing global and regional status.

Fair’s book has many strengths. Its detailed citations, interview materials, and references to internal army publications are all useful. However, often one gets a sense that Fair is more interested in the trees than the forest. *Fighting to the End* bogs down in details without linking them properly to the larger argument it advances in the first few chapters. The book discusses international relations theory occasionally, but some concepts, such as “reckless realism,” are not explicated sufficiently. What is laudable, however, is Fair’s willingness, as someone who used to be sympathetic to many of the activities of the Pakistani military, to reconsider her views upon seeing the facts differently. More such daring works are needed if Pakistan is to ever get out of the rut that it has been stuck in for so long.

Shah’s *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan* offers a rich and comprehensive analysis of the evolution of Pakistan’s military and its continued control over the body politic, making it impossible for the country to emerge as a proper democracy. Shah presents some new materials by locating Pakistani military writings and conducting interviews with generals, which offer insight into their worldviews. Over nine chapters, he narrates the story of how the army became the most important societal actor in Pakistan and exposes the reasons for this continued dominance, contrasting this history with that of neighboring India and a large number of erstwhile military-ruled states that became proper democracies in the past three decades. The book provides detailed analysis of pivotal moments when the military strengthened its position.

While I see much merit in *The Army and Democracy*, a few drawbacks need to be addressed. The book is more in the category of a rich narrative than a theoretical study of why Pakistan is the way it is. Shah does not offer a compelling causal mechanism for Pakistan’s predicament other than highlighting the India threat and the original sin of the unfulfilled promises

of partition. He needed to explain how accurate this threat perception has been rather than accepting at face value the almost paranoid assessments that Pakistani generals make of the India threat (many of which he quotes). From the discussion, it appears that the India threat is a convenient excuse for some larger reasons for a military to behave this way, as many countries facing existential threats from their neighbors have become developmental states and proper democracies after periods of military rule. South Korea and Taiwan are good examples.

The book also neglects the strategic and civilizational parity that the military elite has been seeking with India, a neighbor some seven to eight times as large according to most measures of material power. If the threat perception is largely based on size, then India's disintegration or complete weakening is the only condition that will make Pakistan secure. All the other factors the military talks about—such as India fomenting internal conflict in Pakistan or supporting Afghanistan's development—are exaggerated arguments often mirroring what Pakistan does toward India. All major wars, except partially the war of 1971, and a majority of crises in this dyad have been initiated by Pakistan, and this itself shows who the revisionist party is here. India's strategy (arguably even with the Cold Start doctrine of faster and concentrated mobilization in the event of a major terrorist attack by Islamist groups supported by Pakistan) is reactive and defensive inasmuch as the onus of first strike often rests with Pakistan.

Shah also dismisses class structure as an explanation for the military's dominance of Pakistani society. Most works on democratic development treat the class structure of a country as key to democratic transition and consolidation. Pakistan's main challenge has been the absence of a powerful and progressive middle, or labor, class willing to defend democracy and push for change. The collaboration between the landed aristocracy and the military has created the worst form of hybrid governance and economic organization for a country in the modern world. Without land reforms, Pakistan is unlikely to generate a viable middle class. Without proper education, especially liberal education, the middle class is unlikely to become progressive. The military keeps playing double games to extract as much money as possible from the great powers and friendly states, and its dependence on these resources to satisfy its own corporatist interests has generated a geostrategic curse on Pakistan (which I describe in my book *The Warrior State*). Egypt is the closest parallel to Pakistan one can find in the contemporary world, although Cairo has not used terrorism as a weapon to achieve its goals.

Finally, both books are long and could have been limited to two hundred pages. *The Army and Democracy* is at times repetitive, and the last few chapters provide narrations that are common knowledge by now. The book would have benefited from introducing theories of development in comparative politics, international relations literature, and especially political psychology to offer a more comprehensive explanation. Yet despite those limitations, both *The Army and Democracy* and *Fighting to the End* add to our understanding of a highly complex country and are welcome additions to the growing literature on the multifaceted challenges confronting Pakistan.

Pakistan's Army: Running and Ruining a Country

C. Christine Fair

T.V. Paul, a professor of international relations at McGill university, and Aqil Shah, a long-time scholar of democratization in Pakistan, have written two very different but ultimately complementary accounts of the Pakistan Army—*The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* and *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*, respectively. Both books describe Pakistan's long-standing security competition with India and exposit the primary means through which Pakistan has sought to impose its will on India: a reliance on Islamist proxies, an ever-expanding nuclear arsenal, and alliances with countries like the United States, China, and Saudi Arabia, among others. Whereas Paul focuses on the policies pursued by the military and their sequelae, Shah focuses on how the institution of the army came to dominate the Pakistani state. Whereas Paul places the blame for Pakistan's development largely on the United States, Shah holds the army accountable for its ruinous role in the troubled state.

The Warrior State examines the roles of war and war-making in the development of Pakistan in particular and several other historical and contemporary nation-states in Europe and Asia. Paul finds that although the experiences of many countries suggest that war-making helped spur national development and consolidation, Pakistan's own trajectory has been an outlier. Despite pursuing militarized security for some six decades, Pakistan is insecure and politically fragmented. The book describes how Pakistan's political elite pursued militarized security at the expense of the country's political, human, and economic development. Oddly, for the most part, Pakistan's citizenry has supported these policies and has rallied around the army's incessant warmongering and selfish claims on the state's budget.

Paul argues that great-power patrons such as the United States—and to a lesser degree China—have played a preeminent role in undermining Pakistan's development, security, and ultimately stability. These patrons discouraged the Pakistani elite from forging state policies that would enhance social, economic, and political development and incentivized

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them to instead pursue geopolitical goals and a narrow strategy of military security based on hyper-realpolitik assumptions. In doing so, these elites have neglected other potential national goals and, in turn, have undermined the state's very viability. In summary, Paul contends that because of the interests of great powers, Pakistan's political elites have "had both the motive and the opportunity to pursue such policies" (p. 3). Like Ayesha Siddiqi and Husain Haqqani before him, Paul puts forward the argument that Pakistan is a rentier state that has lived "off the rents provided by its external benefactors for supporting their particular geostrategic goals" (p. 18). He further argues that Pakistan's alliance with the United States through the Mutual Defense Pact of 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was "the beginning of the geostrategic curse" (p. 117). *The Warrior State's* overarching argument is important and compelling. The book's logical conclusion is that the United States and China are responsible for a large share of the burden for enabling the recklessness of this crisis-prone state.

Yet this argument is not without some important problems. First, Paul implies that the United States sucked Pakistan into its alliance strategy. With India being unwilling to join hands with the United States, the latter was "desperately looking for strategic partners in Asia-Pacific.... Sensing a major opportunity, the Pakistani elite began discussions with Washington and in 1954 they struck an alliance" (pp. 116–17). At times, the book implies that the United States was predatory in its approach to cultivate Pakistan as a partner. However, until the mid-1950s, Washington was disinterested in South Asia and was generally content to let the United Kingdom take the lead in the region. In the early years after Pakistan's independence, General Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan repeatedly made overtures to the United States to ally with Pakistan, noting Pakistan's strategic utility, yet their appeals were rebuffed by Washington. Only after the onset of the Korean War did Washington become interested in the "northern tier" defense concept discussed by Paul.¹

In fact, Pakistan was very keen to offer its strategic utility to Washington, which is illustrated by its extensive lobbying efforts to join

¹ The northern tier defense concept, which gave rise to CENTO, was modeled after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). CENTO was formed in 1955 and included Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom. The United States was not a member but had observer status. (Iraq withdrew from the organization in 1958.) SEATO was formed in 1955 and included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These three treaty organizations together formed a band of countries to prevent Soviet expansion. The eastern-most partner of NATO was Turkey, which was also included in CENTO. Pakistan in turn linked SEATO to the alliance system.

SEATO. Contrary to Paul's account, the U.S. Department of Defense initially opposed Pakistani membership in SEATO, correctly assessing that Pakistan's inclusion would drive away other Asian states. Washington's apprehensions were justified: ultimately Thailand and the Philippines were the only other Asian states willing to join. Pakistan was adamant in joining in the hopes that membership would provide some protection to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In fact, Pakistan's foreign secretary Zafarullah Khan attended the SEATO organizational meeting in Manila in 1954 with the aim of obtaining a security guarantee against all acts of aggression, even though SEATO—like CENTO—specifically addressed threats from Communist states. U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles, fearing that the United States or SEATO would become enmeshed in Pakistan's security competition with India, outright refused Khan's overtures and further explicitly declared that SEATO defense guarantees would apply only to Communist aggression.² Failing to secure absolute security guarantees, Khan was supposed to seek further instruction from his ministry. However, he signed the treaty without consultation, contending that Pakistan's interests would not be served by backing out after lobbying vigorously to be included. Pakistan's cabinet ratified the treaty in early 1955.

The Warrior State makes a similarly misleading claim with regard to the Soviet-Afghan conflict when it states the "United States played the most significant role in turning Pakistan into a pivotal front-line state in the war against the Soviet Union" (p. 119). Pakistan had in fact formulated its *jihad* strategy in Afghanistan as early as 1974 under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The targets of its complaints with Afghanistan were numerous: Afghanistan's initial vote against Pakistan's inclusion in the United Nations, enduring irredentist claims on significant swathes of land in Baluchistan, refusal to recognize the Durand Line as the border between the countries, and episodic military assaults on Pakistan's border. When Mohammad Daoud Khan ousted the Afghan king, Zahir Shah, and began a Moscow-supported policy of modernization, Afghanistan's Islamists resisted. As Daoud began a campaign of repression, they began to flee into Pakistan and Iran. Bhutto directed the Inter-Services Intelligence's Afghan cell to begin organizing the Islamist resistance. By the time the Russians crossed the Amu Darya river on

² There are several accounts of this, including, inter alia, Husain Haqqani, *Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013); Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001); and Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

Christmas Day in 1979, Pakistan had already formed the major *mujahideen* groups. The Soviet invasion afforded previously rebuffed Pakistan the opportunity to draw the United States—along with Saudi Arabia—into its policy of manipulating affairs in Afghanistan.

Overall, however, Paul's account is compelling, these largely historical quibbles notwithstanding, and should provoke the United States to reflect more closely on the negative consequences of its engagements with Pakistan.

In a different vein, Shah's book, *The Army and Democracy*, focuses on successive institutional decisions by the Pakistan Army itself. If in Paul's account, the army is an object of great-power maneuvers, in Shah's account it is the agent of its own evolution. Whereas Paul wants to inform a larger discussion about the conditions under which war-making contributes to state development, Shah aims to contribute the expansive literature on civil-military relations. Taking Pakistan as his primary case, Shah focuses on the senior officer corps of the Pakistan Army and their "shared ideological framework about the military's role, status, and behavior in relation to a state and society" (p. 9). He contends that these "shared values affect how these officers perceive and respond to civilian governmental decisions, policies, and political crises" (p. 9). Shah hopes that by understanding better these shared values, we can better "assess how the military's particular conceptions of professionalism shape its involvement in politics" (p. 9).

Both authors agree that Pakistan's rivalry with India profoundly shaped the worldview of the Pakistan Army, informed its approach to securing Pakistan, and influenced the trajectory of civil-military relations. Shah notes that this rivalry "spurred the militarization of the Pakistani state in the early years and thus provided the context in which the generals could increase their influence in domestic politics and national security policy" (p. 13). Civilians acquiesced and diverted resources to the military, while abdicating oversight, as the twin efforts of state-building and survival appeared ever more synonymous with the war effort. *The Army and Democracy* traces out the opportunity structures that Pakistan's army created and exploited to foist itself increasingly to the center of the state.

Shah's inquiry complements that of Paul. Both scholars seek to explain why Pakistan remains insecure despite pursuing security-oriented policies. Shah, like Paul, identifies puzzles in the extant literature. For example, conventional wisdom and recent political science scholarship suggest that "external security threats result in civilian supremacy over the military" (p. 9). By that logic, Pakistan's long-standing enmities with India and even Afghanistan should have ensured civilian dominance over the army. Shah

argues that these threat-based understandings of the relationship between the soldier and the state omit a critical intervening variable: national unity. He concludes that external threats will produce civilian dominance over the military only when there is domestic cohesion—something which has long eluded Pakistan.

The Army and Democracy concludes by putting forward a series of policies that, over time, may help Pakistan's civilians "guard the guardians." Shah envisions this process encompassing two phases: transition and consolidation. In the former phase, the primary objective is "to reduce the military's capacity to intervene in politics and keep the democratic process functioning" (p. 263). The latter is accomplished by "consolidating democratic supremacy through strengthening the administrative capacity of the [Ministry of Defence], parliamentary oversight...and the redefinition of military missions and professionalism" to render them compatible with democratic governance (p. 263). Transitioning Pakistan from authoritarianism to democracy has potential implications for the state's belligerence toward India; after all, the scholarly literature suggests that two democratic states rarely wage war against each other. Shah, however, is realistic about the prospects for such a transition in any near-term time horizon.

Policymakers, particularly in the United States, would do well to contemplate Shah's suggestions and consider how U.S. policies may support a democratic transition in Pakistan. At the same time, U.S. policymakers must evaluate the significant challenges posed by Paul, who is surely correct when he alleges that the United States—perhaps more than any other state—has aided and abetted the most pernicious policies of the Pakistan Army, even while spending enormous resources to contain the same. In short, South Asian security analysts should take on board the largely complementary arguments marshalled by both of these authors.

Author's Response:
Military Influence and the Reality of Politics in Pakistan

Aqil Shah

I am thankful to all the reviewers for their incisive and helpful comments on my book *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*. Most have raised intriguing questions and issues for me to ponder in future research on the topic. Let me respond to some important points raised by the reviewers.

In their thoughtful reviews, Christine Fair and Marvin Weinbaum illuminate the theoretical, empirical, and policy angles of my research. On the policy front, I second Fair's conclusion that the United States would do well to consistently support a democratic transition in Pakistan rather than putting all of its eggs in the basket of the military, which has been the default and misguided U.S. policy since the early 1950s. By enabling and empowering the generals vis-à-vis the political parties and civil society, this policy has had negative consequences (to put it mildly) both for Pakistan's internal politics and, as Fair ably documents in her book, for regional and international security.

Weinbaum points to an important omission in my work that is also common to the other two books under review: namely the lack of discussion of the interaction between the military and extremists and of its consequences for shaping the ideological beliefs that may underlie Pakistan's national security policies toward India, Afghanistan, and the United States. In defense, I would like to note that the primary focus of my book is the domestic political impact of the military's tutelary organizational beliefs, even though these are linked to and often rationalized in the context of perceived external insecurity.

In his review, John Gill suggests that my book does not pay sufficient attention to the role of "civilian" actors in civil-military relations. He correctly notes that politicians share the blame for the military's intervention in politics because of their incompetence, corruption, or complicity. I also accept his point that Pakistan's chances of breaking out of its authoritarian trap are contingent on both civilian and military choices. However, in

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my humble opinion, analyzing the weakness of democratic institutions, norms, and practices in Pakistan as a product of politicians' ostensible venality is an equally inadequate approach because it fails to account for the real possibility that these nonmilitary factors are endogenous to military influence. Moreover, I wrote my book precisely with the goal of understanding the role of the military in politics from the perspective of the officer corps, an aspect largely ignored in the literature on civil-military relations in Pakistan and even beyond (with a few notable exceptions).¹ To be convincing, any story of military politics has to take into account the military's characteristic institutional features that shape its responses to specific political and security stimuli. In particular, its members' shared interpretations of their appropriate role in the polity do this by making some choices appear more plausible than others in a given situation.

Gill also suggests that I am too critical of the army's relationship with the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) government. He cites two examples to prove civilian dereliction of duty: the PPP leadership's alleged inability to provide General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani with "strategic advice" and civilian failure in taking over the reins of administration from the army once it had cleared Swat of militants. For one, I find it hard to believe that Kayani ever seriously solicited the PPP leadership's advice on strategic issues, given that he and his fellow generals believed that civilian politicians were ill-educated, that they had the "wrong attitude," that they "had not read basic defense policy documents," that they lacked a "reading culture," and that "even [their] thought process was non-existent."² Besides, the militarized nature of Pakistani foreign policy, which typically excludes or ignores politicians' input or direction, has led to these politicians' pragmatic accommodation of the military's views to avoid conflict or the loss of power. Second, sections of the civilian leadership have been shortsighted, self-interested, and often negligent in performing their basic job of providing a semblance of public order in places like Swat. However, it is important to acknowledge that Pakistan's civilian administrations do not have the requisite capacity to carry out this task. This is in part because the military has steadily

¹ See, for instance, Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in *Arguing Comparative Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 23–38; J. Samuel Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 61–105; and Brian D. Taylor, *Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689–2000* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

² Ahmed Shuja Pasha, cited in the Abbottabad Commission, *Abbottabad Inquiry Commission Report* (Islamabad, January 2013), 203, available at Al Jazeera  <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/binladenfiles/2013/07/201378143927822246.html>.

encroached on civilian functions such as law enforcement, intelligence gathering, and in some cases (such as Benazir Bhutto's assassination) even criminal investigations and has impaired the development of administrative capacity and autonomy. In this situation, the default, if democratically corrosive, response of an insecure and weak civilian government is again to pass the buck to the army (as is evident in the recent institution of special military courts to try terrorism cases).

I am humbled by the praise from Hasan Askari Rizvi, the author of the first authoritative social science monograph on the Pakistan military's political role, of my book as the "most current and comprehensive study" of civil-military relations in Pakistan based on hard data and "major theoretical formulations about different facets of civil-military relations in developing countries." I concur with his suggestion that my analysis would have been richer if I had compared the formation and persistence of Pakistani military attitudes with those in civilian-dominated states like India. Hopefully, I can in time carry out a comparative study of military attitudes in both consolidated democratic and authoritarian contexts.

T.V. Paul's review of my book makes three main points. First, he dismissively claims that my work is not theoretical but merely historical. Leaving aside the hubris inherent in the outright rejection of historical narrative as inferior to deductive theory, my book does in fact take a theoretically driven approach to explain military politics in Pakistan. In tracing the origins, evolution, and persistence of the Pakistan military's political interventions and dominance, I draw on insights from the literature on military politics and sociological institutionalism and use social science concepts such as organizational norms and path dependency. As acknowledged by one of the leading scholars of comparative civil-military relations, Zoltan Barany at the University of Texas–Austin,³ my book also makes a vital theoretical contribution by highlighting a missing variable—national unity—that links divergent threat-based theories of civilian control (namely, the Lasswellian proposition that threats empower and politicize the military and the Andreskian argument that threats depoliticize the soldiers by creating national unity and focusing the military on external warfighting).⁴ Using the case of Pakistan, I show that the prior

³ See Barany's endorsement on the dust jacket of my book.

⁴ See Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State," *American Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 4 (1941): 455–68; Stanislav Andreski, *Military Organization and Society*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1968); and Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

level of national cohesion and consensus on the enemy mediates the “rally around the flag effect” of military threats. Hence, external threats can either unify or fracture polities, depending on the existing level of “we-ness.”

Second, and surprisingly, Paul contends that my argument lacks a causal mechanism connecting the perceived security threat from India to the military’s behavior. Yet I clearly demonstrate that the primary causal mechanism at work in my explanation is the “logic of appropriateness” (see pp. 7–9). Simply put, military organizations make sense of their external environment and respond to perceived threats in the ways they consider most appropriate. Paul’s review goes on to claim that I accept the Pakistan military’s “paranoid” threat assessments at face value. Any social science researcher’s job is to interpret evidence, not impute intentions to political actors. My assessment of Pakistani threat perceptions in the formative decade following independence is based on declassified government documents that show clearly that the country’s civilian and military elite (which as Weinbaum points out, Paul lumps together) importantly perceived an existential threat from India and their response was to prepare for imminent war (see pp. 61–63 of *The Army and Democracy*). As sociologist Lewis Coser put it, “If men define a threat as real, although there may be little or nothing in reality to justify this belief, the threat is real in its consequences.”⁵ Hence, whether these leaders were paranoid is beside the point. What matters is that this perception shaped their choices at the time, which affected Pakistan’s political trajectory. As I argue and show in my book, Pakistani elite beliefs were products of the military’s formative institutional experience under conditions of external insecurity and internal divisions. These beliefs have since proved durable because they have become embedded over time in the military’s socialization processes. (Fair makes a similar path-dependent argument to show the origins and ossification of the military’s strategic culture.)

Finally, Paul faults my book for “dismissing” the role of class structure in explaining military coups and rule in Pakistan. In particular, he appears to view the landed elite’s collaboration with the military as a key obstacle to the country’s democratic development, albeit without providing any evidence in either his review or his book. The balance of class power in a society or social coalitions is of course important in shaping political outcomes. However, the military institution, which typically controls the most lethal coercive resources of the state, has the capacity and often the

⁵ Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1956), 89.

inclination to advance its corporate interests with relative autonomy from social groups. As Pakistan's history shows, the military has been quite promiscuous in its choice of political partners, partnering with or disposing of leaders, parties, and other weighty allies in accordance with the military's view of its interests at the time. For example, it ousted prominent Punjabi landlords such as Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon in 1958, Sindhi landed elites such as Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977, and even Punjabi industrialists such as Nawaz Sharif in the 1990s when they challenged the military's definition of the "supreme national interest."

No doubt drawing on Barrington Moore's famous dictum "no bourgeoisie, no democracy," Paul also claims in his review essay that the main challenge of democratization in Pakistan is the "absence of a powerful and progressive middle class." There are at least two fundamental problems with this argument. First, if the vast social science literature on democratization has taught us anything, it is that there is no single, universal route to democracy; different countries often traversed different paths of democratization. Second, the link between the middle class and democracy is in itself problematic. Even in Western Europe, the bourgeoisie was rarely ever the heroic vanguard of modernity and democracy. The view of the bourgeoisie as a distinct and self-confident class striving for liberal democracy is misleading because it eliminates the real possibility of political divisions within the middle class. From Thailand to Turkey, different middle class groups have supported authoritarian regimes, not because of these groups' weakness but as a consequence of their calculating the danger democratic politics posed to their political and economic interests.

Regardless of these disagreements, I have greatly benefitted from this engaging exchange of ideas with a group of highly seasoned political scientists and scholars of Pakistan.

Author's Response: The Paradoxes of Pakistan

T.V. Paul

The reviews of my book *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* by five leading scholars of Pakistan are gratifying, and I appreciate the positive comments they made on the strengths of the book along with the two other books under review. The discussions by the reviewers are both rich and in-depth, and the reviews substantially enhance the debate on a crucial country whose policies impinge on regional and global security in areas such as transnational terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Since none of the reviewers frontally question my central argument, I will respond to the qualms they have expressed on specific details. I want to emphasize that my effort in this book is to offer an honest analysis on Pakistan's predicament rather than a narrative history or a politically correct assessment.

As a social scientist, I am interested in intellectual puzzles in world politics, and almost all my previous single-authored books are puzzle-driven. My objective is to explore a paradoxical outcome with the aid of established theories or variables in an eclectic fashion as rigorously as possible. Any methodologically oriented scholar of social science recognizes that the aim of a researcher should be to systematically explain the greatest number of effects with the least number of variables. If the argument or hypothesis, drawing on a critical variable or set of variables, can satisfactorily account for a phenomenon, it is attractive. One hundred percent accuracy is not feasible. Thus, the measure of success for a work is not that it captures all the different nuances but that it explains the core central issue or puzzle and then applies these findings to larger theoretical or policy questions. If the theory is able to account for subsequent events, it is all the more useful. Events in Pakistan since the publication of the book in January 2014 support my claims fairly well. The hybrid system continues, with the military pushing the civilian government out of foreign and defense policy, and internal violence has increased to higher levels during the past year. The core warrior state of Pakistan shows no signs of losing its strength.

I believe we need more easy-to-follow theoretical works on Pakistan rather than rich descriptive narratives. There are too many bestsellers

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cashing in on this country's sad state of affairs without explaining why Pakistan is the way it is. We need more diagnostic works so that scholars can offer ideas for change. In this spirit, let me address each criticism from the reviewers. Because John Gill does not make many criticisms, I focus on the other reviewers' comments.

Marvin Weinbaum takes issue with my lack of discussion on the interactions between the jihadists and the military. I agree with his call for a book (or books) on this subject, as these two-way interactions need to be explained further to understand Pakistan's strategic choices. The big challenge here is the lack of reliable data. Weinbaum's second main point concerns the extent of Taliban control of the country. I have cited scholarly works or reports on the extent of Taliban control in 2009, and one can quibble over the difference between mere control of territory and active presence. I concur that a better term would have been "active presence." Recent school shootings in Peshawar suggest that the Taliban, largely a Pashtun group, can wreak havoc on Pakistan if it wants to do so. So the Taliban's impact on Pakistan's domestic and external security and policies is a matter of interpretation.

Hasan Askari Rizvi's works have influenced my thinking on Pakistan's early years, and this influence is reflected in the book. His criticism that I do not focus comprehensively on India-Pakistan relations, regional politics, global affairs, and so forth could have been avoided only if the book were to provide a larger historical account of the country. As I mentioned, my intention was to focus intensively on the critical phenomena of war and state-making and the obverse outcome in Pakistan. I also wanted to write a short book because a voluminous work would not have done justice to my goal. Within these parameters, I discuss these elements as much as I can.

I also wanted to challenge the defensive nationalist narrative in Pakistan that is dominant among the elite and intellectuals who blame the rest of the world for the country's predicament. As such, I attempt to show that the outcome is largely the result of choices the Pakistani elite made and how they used or misused geostrategic opportunities and constraints. No amount of defensive nationalism will rectify the situation, and it is in the interest of Pakistan that Pakistanis start correcting their national narratives and seek a peaceful social revolution regarding national ideology, strategies, and goals.

Aqil Shah raises a number of issues with my argument to which I would like to respond. First, he argues that both South Korea and Taiwan had direct security guarantees and hence were free to pursue developmental

economic policies. The big challenge here is to prove counterfactually what would have happened if Pakistan had direct protection from the United States or China. What guarantee is there that Pakistan would not have been emboldened to carry out more wars, crises, and revisionist agendas? In fact, during all the wars Pakistan initiated or participated in, there was an expectation of military or political support from the United States and China, in particular in 1965, 1971, and 1999. So there is no guarantee that an elite driven by a highly ambitious revisionist strategy would have mollified its policies just because it had a security guarantee from the great-power patron. If the security challenge is largely self-generated, it is very unlikely that a great-power alliance would have tempered that revisionism.

A second critique is that South Korea and Taiwan are homogeneous societies, which therefore facilitated their transition to democracy. This is a very contentious argument. Going by this logic, China would have seen democracy, while multi-ethnic India and Indonesia would have become authoritarian. What is surprising is that ethnic homogeneity is not necessarily correlated with higher degrees of democracy. In fact, some of the most illiberal democracies have been those where a single ethnic group dominated. Take the case of Sri Lanka, for example, where the dominant Sinhalese (constituting nearly 75% of the population) have suppressed minority rights. Pakistan also has a dominant ethnic group in the form of Punjabi Sunni Muslims, who instead of integrating minorities have engaged in repressive policies and alienated minorities such as Shias, Ahmadis, and the small Christian and Hindu groups, as well as the populations of provinces like Baluchistan. We should also not forget that fascism thrived under ethnic homogeneity in Germany, Italy, and Japan.

A dominant argument that I make in the book is that countries facing intense security threats confront them with different strategies. The elite needs good ideas and strategies to achieve successful results. The challenge here is that the Pakistani elite's main reference points are not progressive but top-down, and thus their ideas are unlikely to make much improvement in the state's policies. Further, continuous pressure from progressive civil society is needed to change policies, and that is also missing in Pakistan.

Shah considers that if the geostrategic curse were the issue, why did Pakistan not change during periods when it received little or no U.S. help. This generates questions about the larger argument. Did Pakistan experience a major economic crisis, and did its elite face the need for reforms during those periods, as did India, for example, in 1991? Was U.S. aid supplanted by aid from other states, such as Saudi Arabia or China? Did international

financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank pump money into Pakistan whenever it faced a crisis? The answer to all these questions is in the affirmative, and therein lies the problem. Given the low amount of taxes collected, Pakistan compensated for its budget deficits through other sources. It was never allowed to default and face a financial crisis, which would have fomented reforms. Someone was always there to rescue it for geopolitical reasons. Countries change only when the elite are forced to do so, facing intense crises. The impact of geostrategic curse is a long-term one, and episodic breaks in U.S. aid will not make a big difference unless alternative sources of aid from other geopolitical allies dry up.

Shah also offers an argument based on the original sin—that is, the way the partition of British India occurred for Pakistan’s later troubles. Then the founding leaders’ policies took a life of their own. This is not fully discounted in my analysis, but I point out that the argument assumes that countries with initial challenges do not change. My central claim, by contrast, is that during critical turning points a country can change (as is evident in several previously authoritarian states, some of which emerged from even worse original situations than Pakistan, such as South Korea).

Christine Fair claims that I focus the blame for Pakistan’s situation almost exclusively on the United States. However, this reading of my argument is selective. The central theme of the book is that the Pakistani elite used the U.S. alliance differently from their South Korean or Taiwanese counterparts. My criticism takes aim at peculiar, short-sighted policies of the United States that focus on transactional aid rather than trade (unlike in South Korea and Taiwan) and thus miss every opportunity to force change in a positive direction. The success of Pakistan’s asymmetrical bargaining strategy shows that the United States either underestimated or did not care about the long-term effects of its policies, a lingering problem even today.¹

Fair also asserts that it was Pakistan that took the initiative to form an alliance with the United States. My book acknowledges that Pakistan moved to become a U.S. ally at the first opportunity in the 1950s. But everything I have read suggests that this was a two-way process and that the Eisenhower administration, especially John Foster Dulles with his intense hostility toward Nehru’s nonaligned India, found Pakistan martial and trustworthy. There is compelling evidence that the United States played a key role in the

¹ For powerful examples of this narrative, see Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer, *How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2011); and Husain Haqqani *Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013).

installation of Ayub Khan in 1958 and in the successive removal of prime ministers even before that. By the early 1960s, nearly a decade of U.S. interactions ended up with the three A's—Allah, army, and America—as the key players in Pakistani politics.

I am also not persuaded by Fair's exoneration of the United States in the Soviet war in Afghanistan. She claims that Pakistan already had a jihadist strategy to fight in Afghanistan. But the extent of the country's involvement would have been minimal until and unless the United States, through the CIA, participated in the war and elevated the Inter-Services Intelligence's role as the conduit for the money and weapons that eventually propelled the withdrawal of the Soviet Union.²

None of this is to absolve Pakistan or its strategic choices. In the book, I discuss the Pakistani elite's exploitation of geostrategic opportunities to achieve their narrow goals at every turn of the relationship. The big question is why the elite did not turn the country's alliance with the United States into a blessing. To me, the answer lies in the peculiar policies that Pakistan, on the one side, and the United States, its Western allies, and international financial institutions, on the other, adopted toward each other. *Warrior State* does not engage in a blame game but attempts a social science diagnosis. Overall, my aim was to explain larger processes rather than to fill in minor details. Whether or not one agrees with my analysis, we need more diagnosis than narrative or description to understand Pakistan.

² Steve Coll's *Ghost Wars* paints a different picture than Fair presents here. See Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).

Author's Response:
The United States Needs a New Policy toward Pakistan

C. Christine Fair

First, I would like to extend my appreciation for all the thoughtful constructive criticism offered by my colleagues in this roundtable. This is truly an opportunity for learning from some of the finest thinkers on this complex subject, and I hope to incorporate these suggestions and challenges in future work on this topic. In this essay, I would like to address a few suggestions that deserve special attention or response.

John Gill is most certainly spot on when he suggests that scholars need to better understand how the Pakistan Army manages its image and how its obsession with this influences the army's domestic and international behavior. As Gill noted, I made some efforts to contend with this complex puzzle. However, obtaining relevant data is extremely challenging. Given that I am blacklisted by Pakistan's intelligence agency, I have little expectation of ever being able to return to the country to take on this puzzle more robustly. Hopefully, other scholars who are better positioned to do so may answer Gill's important call.

Marvin Weinbaum, in his review, is absolutely correct to note that none of our books "cast much light on the interactions between the military and extremist groups." He finds missing "discussion about how those values and beliefs associated with Islamic groups may have contributed to forming the military's thinking, including policies toward India, Afghanistan, and the West." I do spend considerable space discussing aspects of this complex set of relations, but the data sources that I used for the book do not illuminate this issue to his or my satisfaction. My current work in progress, which focuses on the writings of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), will in some measure elucidate the vast similarities between official army publications and those of this proscribed terrorist organization. However, LeT is only one of numerous militant groups employed by Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies to prosecute Pakistan's policies at home and abroad. Weinbaum and I will likely not be able to resolve our differences in opinion regarding the degree to which the Pakistan Army's thinking has evolved either about the need for strategic depth or about the utility of the zoo of militants that the army and intelligence agencies have cultivated. Weinbaum is much more optimistic than I am, and

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only time will tell which view is more accurate. I would argue that it is less injurious to U.S. interests to err on the side of skepticism. In the past, the United States' cupidity and propensity to see the best in Pakistani intentions only rewarded Islamabad for its perfidy while undermining Washington's interests at the expense of the American taxpayer.

Hasan Askari Rizvi, like Weinbaum, is also skeptical about the durability of "strategic depth" in the army's thinking. He specifically argues that the introduction of nuclear weapons obviates such a requirement. However, the facts belie this claim. As I note in my book, we now know that Pakistan had a crude nuclear device from about 1980. However, during the 1980s and 1990s, there is wide scholarly consensus that Pakistan continued to view Afghanistan through this lens of strategic depth. Moreover, only one general—Mirza Aslam Beg—understood strategic depth as affording Pakistan with a physical space. As chief of the Pakistan Army between 1988 and 1991, Beg was a fierce proponent of strategic depth in the physical sense, and his tenure was marked by considerable nuclear proliferation. More generally, the cultivation of strategic depth in Afghanistan has not been viewed as a strategy for developing a physical sanctuary for Pakistan's forces and war materiel; rather, it has been understood in zero-sum terms as opening up a political space in which Pakistan can compete with India for access. I see no evidence that suggests that Pakistan has abandoned this view of Afghanistan as a space to be politically cultivated.

Aqil Shah is correct in his assessment that I "discount the role of political learning on elite attitudes and behavior." He argues that "as the case of Brazil and other Latin American countries demonstrates, the experience of authoritarian government can unite political elite against military praetorianism, and electoral competition can create incentives for them to erode the military's undue political and strategic influence." Shah is infinitely better positioned than am I to draw from these other cases given his broader training and engagement of important examples outside South Asia. Indeed, he makes this case in his own superb book. I do hope that Shah is correct in his optimism. I also share his assessment that "Pakistan's most recent transition from authoritarian rule in 2007–8 has revealed that major political parties like the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) have learned their lessons from exile, incarceration, and repression under authoritarian rule and appear strongly committed to the democratic process." However, the army has also forged tools to manage these new developments and sustain core military interests such as control over Pakistan's foreign and defense policies.

Turning to T.V. Paul's review, he is correct to note that my volume does not engage international relations (IR) theory; rather, I use the literature of strategic culture more as a heuristic tool. Of course, I am very upfront about this in the volume. After all, my training is in the humanities and my PhD is in South Asian languages and civilizations. In my research, I aim to be an empirically grounded scholar of South Asian political military affairs with a firm rooting in the languages, cultures, and societies of the countries in which I work. In writing my book, I precisely sought to engage the various audiences who are devoted to understanding Pakistan specifically and South Asia generally. If scholars of IR or other disciplines find my book useful, I will be grateful and humbled. One of my objectives is to inform the U.S. government and other nations that are aiding and abetting the worst of Pakistan's behaviors. Even if adopting policies that treat Pakistan like a greedy state does not change its behavior, at least Islamabad will not be cultivating jihadis and nuclear weapons on the U.S. dime. However, my main goal is to communicate to Pakistanis. If Pakistan's army is ever to be ousted from power, and if Pakistan is ever to be anything but a source of regional insecurity, Pakistanis need to understand what their military and its civilian accomplices have done and then demand change.

I was not surprised that Paul opined that in my book one often "gets a sense that Fair is more interested in the trees than the forest." He is surely correct. After all, if one does not understand the "trees" thoroughly, how can one accurately depict the "forest" that they collectively form? As some of the reviewers pointed out, Paul could have benefited from a closer examination of these varied trees, particularly the various important distinctions in Islam's interpretative traditions and among militant groups. With respect to Islamist terrorist actors, for example, Paul regrettably conflates the Jamaat-e-Islami-based so-called *mujahideen* of the 1980s with the Deobandi Taliban organization of the mid-1990s onward. He also conflates all the militant groups operating in and from Pakistan and Afghanistan with "Wahabbis." Paul could have paid more attention to the domestic political issues along the lines of Shah. And as I noted in my own review, his recounting of the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations dangerously repeats Pakistani fictions that place the onus of Pakistan's problems on the United States rather than on the country's military and civilian leadership who sought to render Pakistan a rentier state.

Yet most the disquieting assertion in his review is a statement that is ostensibly a compliment. Paul writes that "what is laudable...is Fair's willingness, as someone who used to be sympathetic to many of the

activities of the Pakistani military, to reconsider her views upon seeing the facts differently.” His contention that I have been “sympathetic” to Pakistan’s activities is unfounded. Notably, he provides no example of such positions I have taken to buttress this contention. In fact, my track record as a scholar and policy analyst undermines this assertion. In 2004, for example, I detailed the various Islamist militant groups and the state support they enjoy in Pakistan.¹ In 2007, I argued that the focus on *madrasahs* (religious seminaries) as a source of terrorist labor is misplaced because the real problem is the state’s dedication to using terrorists as tools of foreign policy.² In 2009, I was the first scholar of Pakistan to openly call for containing Pakistan because of the state’s refusal to abandon jihad under a nuclear umbrella as a principal tool of foreign policy.³ I have insisted on this position since then even though it has had few takers in Washington. Over the last decade, I have testified before various U.S. congressional subcommittees and have been unsparing and unflinching in my criticism of the Pakistan Army, the Inter-Services Intelligence, and the flotilla of terrorist organizations Pakistan employs and the impunity it enjoys in doing so.⁴ And I have paid for this position personally—by being threatened by Pakistani intelligence—and professionally by being

¹ C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qaeda and Other Organizations,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 27, no. 6 (2004): 489–504.

² C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: A New Look at the Militancy-Madrasah Connection,” *Asia Policy*, no. 4 (July 2007): 107–34. This view was later expanded in C. Christine Fair, *The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2008).

³ C. Christine Fair, “Time for Sober Realism: Renegotiating U.S. Relations with Pakistan,” *Washington Quarterly* 32, no. 2 (2009): 149–72. Some two years later, Bruce Riedel articulated a similar position in the *New York Times*. See Bruce O. Riedel, “A New Pakistan Policy: Containment,” *New York Times*, October 14, 2011 [≈](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/opinion/a-new-pakistan-policy-containment.html) <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/15/opinion/a-new-pakistan-policy-containment.html>.

⁴ See, for example, C. Christine Fair, “Protecting the Homeland against Mumbai-Style Attacks and the Threat from Lashkar-e-Taiba,” report presented to the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Washington, D.C., June 12, 2013 [≈](http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20130612/100964/HHRG-113-HM05-Wstate-FairC-20130612.pdf) <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20130612/100964/HHRG-113-HM05-Wstate-FairC-20130612.pdf>; C. Christine Fair, testimony in the hearing “2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy Towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, Part 1” before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 112th Cong., 1st sess., no. 112–97, Washington, D.C., November 3, 2011 [≈](http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg71039/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg71039.pdf) <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg71039/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg71039.pdf>; C. Christine Fair, “Lashkar-e-Taiba beyond Bin Laden: Enduring Challenges for the Region and the International Community,” testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., May 24, 2011 [≈](http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fair_Testimony.pdf) http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fair_Testimony.pdf; and C. Christine Fair, testimony in the “Hearing before the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services: Afghanistan and Iraq: Perspectives on U.S. Strategy, Part 2,” U.S. House of Representatives, 111th Cong., 1st sess., no. 54–057, Washington, D.C., November 5, 2009 [≈](http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg54057/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg54057.pdf) <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg54057/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg54057.pdf>.

unable to continue doing research in Pakistan. Thus, this accusation is as indecorous as it is baseless.

In conclusion, notwithstanding some of the significant and irresolvable differences of opinion on important matters, participating in this roundtable has been a remarkably rewarding process. I am appreciative to all who have made it possible. ◆