



# Geopolitical Implications of Asia's Rising Energy Demand

NBR; Asia and Energy Security



David Goldwyn, President Goldwyn Global Strategies

May 11, 2012

# A Dose of Humility

When US was leading source of incremental demand we....

- Controlled natural gas prices
- Imposed production quotas (Texas Railroad Commission)
- Sought access overseas
- Tolerated destructive E&P practices
- Banned exports
- Built cross border pipelines
- Subsidized drilling costs (Deepwater, unconventional)
- Invested in R&D
- Imposed demand side measures





# After Exhausting the Alternatives

## US Energy Policy:

- Low taxes
- Open investment
- Liberalized prices
- Open access (pipeline)
- Incentivize drilling (IDC)
- Strategic reserves/storage
- Massive R&D
- Invest in efficiency and alternatives
- Voluntary/mandatory standards

## But:


- Still ban oil exports
- Worry about natural gas exports
- Protect US shipping (Jones Act)
- Won't price carbon



# Key Points

- Asia's rising energy demand can be a strategic opportunity
- Greater Asian gas utilization good for climate, international cooperation
- China's oil demand will force it to greater diplomatic cooperation
- Chinese energy model working poorly for China
- U.S uniquely positioned to facilitate Asian move to gas, and deeper integration of China in collective energy security system
- US and China both ambivalent about strategic cooperation
- A modest program for cooperation


TOP SHALE GAS BASINS BY RECOVERABLE RESOURCES (EST)



Source: Citi GPS: Global Perspectives & Solutions  
Energy 2020: North America, the New Middle East?


# Projections for Chinese Energy Demand

**Figure 13. Energy consumption in the United States, China, and India, 1990-2035 (quadrillion Btu)**



Source: EIA; 2011 IEO


**Figure 2.8 • World primary energy demand by region in the New Policies Scenario**




Source: IEA; 2011 WEO

# Chinese Gas Demand

**Figure 47. Natural gas consumption in non-OECD Asia by country, 2008-2035 (trillion cubic feet)**




# Chinese Oil Demand



# Change in Energy Mix

**Figure 2.10** • Energy mix in selected countries and regions in the New Policies Scenario, 2035




Source: IEA; 2011 WEO



# Impact on Climate


**Figure 2.24** • Energy-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by region in 2035 in the New Policies Scenario and the change from 2010



# Regional Trends

- OECD Asian energy consumption increases only 0.6% each year compared to 3% for non-OECD Asia
- Regional economies continue to grow with South Korea and Australia/New Zealand driving OECD Asia
- Natural gas in the form of LNG will increase its share of consumption in both Japan and Korea
- Malaysia and Indonesia face declining natural gas production


**Figure 57. OECD Asia net natural gas trade, 2008-2035 (trillion cubic feet)**



Source: EIA; 2011 IEO

# Oil and Gas Suppliers of the Future


Figure 43. Largest Global Oil and Gas Producer Entities




Source: Rystad UCube, Citi Investment Research and Analysis

# Major Incremental Suppliers of Oil


**Figure 29. Non-OPEC liquids production by region, 2008 and 2035 (million barrels per day)**



**Figure 28. World liquid fuels production, 1990-2035 (quadrillion Btu)**



# Major Incremental Gas Suppliers






# Takeaways

- Chinese demand for oil major market driver
- Opportunities for sizeable growth in gas production for export, particularly to Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China major gas/LNG consumers (*IEA, WEO 2011*)
- U.S. light, tight oil boom is likely to shift African, Middle East supply to Asia
- China has little upstream access to incremental oil suppliers
- Asia competing for incremental gas supply
- The economies in OECD Asia are growing however energy consumption remains relatively stable due to declining population and aging workforces (*EIA, IEO 2011*)



# A Strategic Opportunity?

- Oil access key for Asian diplomacy
- Open access, free markets, price stability key goals
- Free rider days are over – Conflict prevention matters more
  - Chinese role in Sudan/South Sudan
  - Chinese stake in Iraq
  - Asian cooperation in Iran sanctions
- Asian NOCS can't do deep water, Arctic, or unconventional wells – “can't beat 'em, can't join 'em” unless governments cooperate on security






# Chinese Energy Model Not Working Well

- National champions can't grow without deeper IOC cooperation
- Deep-water: little growth in NOC capacity
- Unconventionals: Can't learn it in the board room
- IP protection, upside key to partnership with IOCs, service companies
- Overseas approach increasingly seen as colonial
- Chinese foreign/economic policy chokepoint for market access



# The U.S. Advantage

- U.S. production growth/pipeline policy major factor for global oil
- U.S. LNG export decisions major factor in global LNG pricing
- U.S. technology – and market access – major factor for China’s indigenous oil and gas production
- Marker on SCS has changed dynamic



# U.S. – China Cooperation: Mutual Ambivalence

- We don't trust each other
- U.S. nativism/Chinese policy impedes Chinese market access
- We want cheap renewable technology and we want to own it
- We want no restraint on key commodities – except our own
- Global energy security depends on sea lane security, not increased regional oil resources



# A Basis for Cooperation?

The U.S. could:

- Help China develop shale and tight oil
- Use LNG exports for strategic cooperation with Japan, Korea
- Break Asian price premium with LNG exports
- Leverage U.S. market access for diplomatic cooperation
- Ensure security of transport and access for non-Chinese Asian nations
- Continue cooperation of vehicles and efficiency

China Could:

- Exchange U.S. market access for Iran's
- Overtly cooperate on oil disruptions
- Open its market for energy investment/production
- Adjust NOC operating style to improve results

