# ECOLOGICAL AND NONTRADITIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTH ASIA

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>iii</td>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>Mahin Karim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Nontraditional Security Challenges in South Asia</td>
<td>Farooq Sobhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Environmental Security and Disaster Management in South Asia: Initial Thoughts on Implications for the United States</td>
<td>Stacy D. VanDeveer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Nontraditional Security and China’s Relations with South Asia</td>
<td>Li Li</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This essay lays out a new nontraditional security paradigm, specifically with respect to security challenges that South Asia faces due to ecological disruptions.

MAIN FINDINGS
• Nontraditional security or ecological crises have been responsible for killing and injuring substantially larger numbers of people over time than conventional military threats, and therefore represent a parallel and arguably more important source of insecurity.
• Ecological or nontraditional security depends on maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between humans and nature, humans and other species, and humans and pathogens, as well as among human societies.
• Demographic changes, specifically population growth, are the most destabilizing factors in developing countries. Ecological security problems are created as the capabilities of nature are unable to meet the demands of rapidly growing societies.
• Deepening globalization and increasing urbanization have the potential to severely destabilize the equilibrium between human populations and pathogens. Recent outbreaks of new infectious diseases may foreshadow serious pandemics in the near future.
• Global warming will have a major impact on all four relationships defining ecological security: coastal areas will be at greatest risk due to flooding; warming will permit pests and pathogens, particularly tropical diseases, to move beyond their traditional regions; and the disruption of ecological equilibrium could increase conflict between societies.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
• The likely exponential increase in ecological security challenges over the next three decades, both globally and in South Asia, must be met by a heightened ecological security perspective capable of identifying and addressing this broad array of challenges.
• Creating a more ecologically secure world will require adjusting defense expenditures to better reflect the actual security threats of the 21st century, which are increasingly nontraditional rather than conventional military threats.
• The adoption of an ecological security perspective will also involve recognizing that we live in a global system in which increasingly porous borders make cooperation among neighboring countries essential for future well-being.
Nearly four decades have passed since the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, where participants made a serious effort to explore alternative ways of thinking about security. Subsequent conferences in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and Johannesburg in 2002 laid out a more comprehensive approach to ecologically sustainable development, intended to enhance nonconventional ways of thinking about security. Since the end of the Cold War, much has happened that legitimizes alternative views of the changing nature of threats to human security in an increasingly interdependent and complex world. These last two decades have been punctuated by increasing numbers of terrorist attacks, state failures, deadly epidemics, rapidly fluctuating world energy and food prices, a global economic meltdown, and intense storms and flooding that are very likely early effects of global warming. These and similar events have given impetus to the development of an alternative paradigm in international relations theory and practice that focuses less on conventional military threats and more on nontraditional security challenges.

The traditional realist paradigm that historically has dominated international relations theory and practice portrays security threats almost exclusively in military terms. While not ignoring such traditional concerns, the “ecological security” paradigm, which traces its diplomatic origins to the Stockholm meeting, gives much greater consideration to nontraditional security threats. This new security perspective holds that the primary function of defense policy is the prevention of premature and needless deaths and injuries, as well as the cultivation of human well-being, broadly defined. An assumption inherent in this ecological or nontraditional paradigm is that significant threats to societies are just as likely to come from changes in human relationships with nature as they are from well-armed troops crossing borders.

Rethinking Security

There can be no question that many parts of the world, South Asia included, remain potentially violent and dangerous places. Given a lengthy historical legacy of military and ethnic conflict, it is not surprising that security in many places is still narrowly defined in realist terms. According to Geoffrey Dabelko and David Dabelko, “at its most fundamental level, the term security has meant the effort to protect a population and territory against organized force while advancing state interests through competitive behavior.” Given the effort that has been associated with this historical quest for wealth and power, limiting security concerns to mostly military matters is understandable, if not completely logical. Defense budgets, for the most part, are still used to purchase tanks and planes and not to fight infectious disease or stem global warming. But while troops massed on borders raise fears of impending destruction and death in some parts of the

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world, in other parts concerns over various kinds of environmental threats have been growing. Additionally, in an era of deepening globalization, infectious diseases can now cross borders more easily and are increasingly being recognized as very serious security threats.

The ravages of nature that have been responsible for killing and injuring much larger numbers of people over time than traditional security threats represent a parallel and arguably more important source of insecurity. Within the old realist paradigm, however, deaths from combat have been considered normal and understandable, whereas many of the more deadly manifestations of discontinuity in humanity’s relationship with nature—such as plagues, pestilence, floods, and droughts—have been poorly understood and thus often ignored. It is estimated, however, that all the wars of the twentieth century resulted in the deaths of about 111 million combatants and civilians, an average of 1.1 million per year. By comparison, infectious diseases are now responsible for taking the lives of between 14 and 15 million people per year.

However, there now are increasing signs of significant changes even among more conventional security planners, and in many countries training for traditional military missions is slowly giving way to cooperative efforts to prevent terrorism, preserve order in failing states, prevent genocide, and provide relief to disaster victims. In 2008, for example, the United States military unveiled a new security doctrine that declared nation-building missions to be more critical than conventional warfare and defined “fragile states” that breed crime, terrorism, and religious and ethnic strife as the greatest threats to U.S. security.

While certainly not ignoring more conventional military threats to human well-being, the emerging ecological security paradigm focuses more heavily on the broad array of challenges presented by nature. Ecological security grows out of the continually evolving relationships between human societies and an ever-changing physical environment that sustains all forms of life. A central assumption inherent in this new way of thinking about security is that threats to well-being are just as likely to come from nature as they are from other people.

Maintaining Ecological Security

Human societies are evolving biological populations that have shaped and been shaped by physical environments shared with other societies, interactions with other animal species, and

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7 Ben Wisner, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and Disasters (London: Routledge, 1994).
Nontraditional Security Challenges in South Asia

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This essay provides an overview of the key nontraditional security (NTS) issues facing South Asia and examines ongoing and potential initiatives to mitigate future NTS challenges.

MAIN FINDINGS

- Excessive military spending in South Asia has been one of the reasons for restricting expenditure on human security and NTS issues. During 1998–2008, defense budgets increased by 41%.

- In South Asia, food costs constitute the average household's largest expenditure. If food prices continue to rise without a matching increase in incomes of people at the bottom of the economic ladder, it is estimated that approximately 100 million people could be pushed back into poverty.

- Over the past 25 years, natural disasters and environmental degradation have killed nearly half a million people in South Asia and inflicted colossal damages estimated at $59 billion.

- The lack of long-term energy planning by South Asian countries has caused human suffering and significantly hindered the entire region's economic growth prospects.

- While there is growing recognition that both traditional and nontraditional security challenges require regional integration and regional solutions, a number of studies in South Asia have found that the main obstacles to such cooperation in countering NTS threats remain mistrust and the absence of political will.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

- South Asian governments have not yet fully realized that military measures and domestic policies alone cannot overcome NTS challenges; rather, many of these challenges must be faced collectively and through regional cooperation.

- A framework for managing regional disasters needs to be designed. The framework should include a comprehensive strategy and action plan, cover institutional mechanisms, provide tools for mitigation measures, and facilitate a legal framework and policy directions.

- Special attention should be paid to strengthening networking among research institutions in the region working on NTS issues and encouraging them to provide inputs, ideas, and strategies for joint action. It is equally important that this network of research institutions closely monitors and evaluates regional and subregional projects.
Since the end of the Cold War, nontraditional security (NTS) issues have become an integral part of the international security discourse. NTS issues involve a complex relationship between traditional security issues and the economic strength of a state. This relationship is increasingly discussed in both domestic and international policy and research agendas of governments, NGOs, academia, and the media. States are now gradually looking beyond traditional security, which has largely been defined in geopolitical and geostrategic terms and confined to the relationships among nation-states and their military strategies.

The last two decades have witnessed growth in a wide range of domestic and international NTS threats, such as environmental disasters, ecological degeneration, air and water pollution, contagious diseases, drugs and small arms trafficking, cross-border movement and internal displacement, financial shocks, cybercrime, terrorism and organized crime, and religious, ideological, and ethnic extremism. On top of these issues, ongoing internal conflicts significantly influence NTS concerns at the regional level in South Asia. Porous borders in the region pose a serious security threat by fuelling not only territorial, ethnic, and communal conflicts but also conflicts arising out of scarce natural resources, in particular, water. This inevitably brings greater distress to the people who have suffered the most from such conflicts. For example, internal conflict situations often generate military responses from states. Therefore, traditional security threats at times become aggravated by NTS threats.

In the case of developing regions, such as South Asia, NTS issues have yet to gain the full attention of governments. The constant competition between India and Pakistan for power and political influence poses severe challenges for national, regional, and global security and stability. South Asian governments do not have the policy structure and infrastructural capacity necessary to tackle existing NTS threats, let alone the ability to cope with the constantly evolving and emerging NTS issues. The inability of government agencies to deal with these issues adequately partly stems from a lack of both human and financial resources. Given these limitations, governments find it very difficult to recognize and address NTS threats due to the complexity of the problems, the absence of institutional capacity, and the lack of regional mechanisms to deal with NTS problems that in many cases cover South Asia as a whole or a significant portion of the region. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to note that the governments in the region have in recent years begun to allocate more financial, natural, and human resources to dealing with NTS threats.

This essay provides an overview of the key NTS issues that require collective action from South Asian states. The first section identifies the linkages between traditional security threats and human security needs in the region and highlights the ongoing dilemma of balancing military security expenditure with the resources required to meet the NTS agenda. The second section illustrates five major NTS challenges in South Asia that warrant immediate attention from all the stakeholders involved in security and development activities. In the third section, the essay demonstrates the progress that has been made in tackling NTS issues in Asia through cooperative initiatives. The essay concludes by arguing that such closer ties and stronger regional cooperation are necessary to address NTS threats. Specifically, cross-border cooperation in water, the environment, health, energy, and terrorism is of critical importance and must be expedited immediately.
Linkages between Traditional Security and Nontraditional Security in South Asia

The concept of NTS is today recognized in South Asia as having a profound influence on the security perspectives of every country in the region. The South Asian region includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The latest available statistics, published by the Asian Development Bank, indicate that the region has about 23% of the world’s population and 15% of the world’s arable land, but receives less than 1% of global foreign investment and tourism revenues, only 2% of global GDP, and 1.2% of world trade. Furthermore, South Asia is still home to about 410 million of the 720 million poor living in the Asia-Pacific region despite the rapid economic growth in India and, to a lesser extent, other countries. Of the 1.4 billion people in South Asia, 42% or 488 million live on less than a dollar a day. In addition, key indicators suggest that social development still remains relatively low when compared to other Asian regions.

Compounding the formidable economic and social challenges facing South Asia are numerous traditional and nontraditional security threats. Yet while South Asian countries confront both military and human security dilemmas, national budgets tend to favor military spending. South Asia’s ratio of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP is one of the highest in the world. According to a 2009 report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), emphasis on defense budgets resulted in a 41% increase in military spending in the region—from $21.9 billion in 1999 to $30.9 billion in 2008. This rate of increase is the highest in the world and comparable with that of North Africa. Defense spending by South Asian countries was 6.5% of regional GDP in 2006, with India spending 2.5% of its GDP on defense; Pakistan, 3%; Bangladesh, 1.2%; and Sri Lanka, 2.6%. If South Asian countries continue to spend excessively on military security, as most presently do, this will inevitably undermine their capacity to support programs that address issues relating to human security and NTS programs. This is one of the principal reasons why the level of poverty continues to remain so high in South Asia.

Furthermore, far from mitigating security threats, the substantial diversion of resources has helped make South Asia one of the major flashpoints in the world, with domestic compulsions and threat perceptions further aggravating the arms race between India and Pakistan. India, which ranked tenth among the top spenders on defense, increased its defense expenditure from $8 billion in 1990 to $30 billion in 2008. Pakistan’s defense expenditure similarly rose from $2.6 billion in 1990 to $3 billion in 2008. These increases took place despite both countries facing military sanctions imposed after their nuclear tests in 1998. Threat perceptions in South Asia are also influenced by the perception, both within the region and internationally, of the lack of adequate safeguard measures to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists, or even an accidental use of nuclear weapons or a false alarm provoking a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan.

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4 Compiled from various sources; for a more detailed exposition, see ADB, Asian Development Outlook 2007: Growth and Change (Manila: ADB, 2007); and World Bank, World Development Report 2009.
Environmental Security and Disaster Management in South Asia: Initial Thoughts on Implications for the United States

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This essay examines the implications for the United States of South Asia’s current and future nontraditional security (NTS) concerns related to environmental security and disaster management.

MAIN FINDINGS

• NTS challenges are most likely to become priority issues for U.S. policymakers when they are perceived to threaten regional stability or the U.S. power position in South Asia.

• It is unlikely that NTS issues in the region will become a U.S. priority, unless they multiply or enhance existing threats or social cleavages.

• U.S. policies and social practices have externalized (that is, globalized) much of the costs of U.S. fossil fuel use and material consumption onto the developing world, where climate change will have a substantial impact without local populations receiving many of the short- and long-term benefits associated with economic growth in OECD countries.

• All evidence suggests that by 2025 South Asia will play host to a larger human population with greater economic inequality that will struggle to survive and prosper amid changing global, regional, and local climates and weather patterns.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

• As the ramifications of climate change accumulate and accelerate, policymakers in affected states will have greater incentive to link their needs to U.S. policy priorities in order to gain leverage with the U.S.

• If the effects of climate change are blamed on the U.S., domestic political actors in the region are likely to exploit popular anger. This has the potential to make international cooperation with U.S. policymakers more difficult or to increase hostility toward U.S. interests in the region more broadly.

• Long-standing disaster threats will likely either persist or worsen, even as growing populations and economies seek greater public-sector capacity to manage environmental security and disaster risks.

• Regional institutions can enhance, but not replace, state and private-sector capacity. Therefore, U.S. engagement in regional institution-building should focus on enhancing the capacities of both the public and private sectors to meet challenges such as infectious diseases, migration, and climatic disasters.
The growing debate and scholarly literature on environment and security relationships and the implications of these for U.S. national security and foreign policy warrant application to the South Asian region.¹ This essay is organized into two sections. The first introduces a framework for understanding the implications for the United States of nontraditional security (NTS) in South Asia, specifically of environmental security and disaster management. The second section then assesses policymakers’ concerns about these issues and draws implications for the future, with a view toward 2025.

Implications of Environmental Security in South Asia for the United States

The United States as a Status Quo Power with Global Interests

The existing U.S. global power position, including U.S. security and economic interests in South Asia, tends to yield a preference for regional stability and the maintenance of the United States’ prominence in the region. In other words, NTS challenges are most likely to be seen as priority issues for U.S. policymakers when they are perceived to threaten regional stability or the U.S. power position. As Dennis Pirages observes, this general expectation and the framework that flows from it stem from the traditional realist thinking that often dominates U.S. foreign and security policymaking in South Asia.² Such a view yields a small number of situations or categories of greatest concern to policymakers:

Threats of international conflict. U.S. security analysts, such as those affiliated with the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and associated intelligence bodies, as well as analysts within military academies and academic institutions, have focused analysis most often on NTS issues with the highest potential for inciting international military conflicts, border incursions, and nonviolent interstate conflicts that could impede U.S. policy goals. For example, concerns about international water management institutions between India and its neighbors are often mentioned.³

Threats to state stability and social order. State failures to manage large-scale humanitarian disasters have the potential to undermine state legitimacy, enhance social cleavages, and engender greater social conflict. Extensive U.S. government research conducted since the 1990s demonstrates that failed states have rarely served to advance U.S. security or economic interests, often leading instead to increased security threats to U.S. interests and increased demands on national security and foreign policy institutions.⁴

¹ For reviews of this extensive literature and its associated debates, see Ken Conca and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, eds., Environmental Peacemaking (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Richard Matthew, "Man, the State and Nature: Rethinking Environmental Security," in Handbook of Global Environmental Politics, ed. Peter Dauvergne (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2005); and Indra de Soya, "Filthy Rich, Not Dirt Poor! How Nature Nurtures Civil Violence," in Dauvergne, Handbook of Global Environmental Politics: For an extensive bibliography of such literature and a host of related resources, see the Environmental Change and Security Project (ECSP) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic_id=1413.
Increased hostility to key U.S. military and economic facilities and interests. NTS challenges will receive greater policy attention in Washington when they are perceived to affect existing or planned U.S. military facilities and infrastructure or centers of U.S. economic interests and investments.

Concerns about threat multiplication. Given the extensive list of concerns and challenges for U.S. policymakers—for example, in Afghanistan and Pakistan—it remains unlikely that NTS issues on their own will become priorities in the near or medium term. The one possible exception to this rule is any trend or development that could multiply or enhance existing threats or social cleavages in the region. For example, declines in agricultural productivity, reductions in freshwater availability, or an increase in drought and storm frequency or intensity would have implications for U.S. security and economic interests, especially when such developments have an impact on the three points above (international conflict risk, state stability and order, and hostility to the United States).

Risks of Climate Geopolitics and Climate Populism

By now it is well known that the United States has historically been the single-largest national contributor to climate change. U.S. economic growth, environmental policies, and lifestyles have contributed substantially to global climate change and its many negative implications. The country also has a long history of uncooperative behavior on climate-change mitigation at the international level and a poor domestic record of curbing its annual emissions growth. Additionally, the United States has not, to date, been forthcoming with financial support for international climate-change adaptation.

These facts yield the inescapable conclusion that U.S. policies and social practices have externalized (that is, globalized) much of the costs of U.S. fossil fuel use and material consumption by passing these costs onto the developing world. Developing countries thus accrue a substantial percentage of the costs of climate change without receiving many of the short-and long-term benefits associated with economic growth in countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This situation increases the risk that the United States can and will be blamed for causing the accelerating list of environmental changes as well as for the related social and economic costs associated with global climate change.5 From a policymaking perspective, this situation raises at least two forms of political risk.

Issue-linkage demands. As the ramifications of climate change accumulate and accelerate, policymakers in affected states may increasingly link their needs for mitigation and adaption assistance—and their desire for side payments of various kinds—to U.S. policy priorities in order to gain leverage with the United States. Such strategies may be purely tactical, with some actors connecting issues that ostensibly have little causal or thematic connections, or countries may seek to reframe and redefine issues by shaping a cluster of issues in ways that are perceived to be interrelated.6

Thus, even if U.S. security policy in South Asia remains focused on antiterrorism efforts and regional stability for some time (and economic policy remains focused on liberalized trade), increased negative impacts of climate change may result in a greater willingness on the part of regional actors to link environmental and human security issues—as well as assistance for disaster management and preparedness—to issues of greater concern to U.S. policymakers. Like other

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5 Chad M. Briggs and Stacy D. VanDeveer, “The European Union,” in Moran, Climate Change.
Nontraditional Security and China’s Relations with South Asia

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This essay examines the implications of emerging nontraditional security challenges for China’s relations with South Asia.

MAIN FINDINGS

- China and South Asia face many of the same nontraditional security challenges, such as limited arable land for large populations, protracted poverty, limited access to energy resources, and environmental threats.
- Several of South Asia’s nontraditional security concerns negatively affect China and its relations with the subcontinent. Poor human security, in terms of poverty and terrorism, jeopardizes Chinese business and investment in the region.
- Regional cooperation on nontraditional security issues is also limited by low levels of cross-cultural linkages. Poor sanitation and health care in South Asia discourage cultural exchanges, such as Chinese tourism and foreign study.
- Water security is an extremely sensitive regional issue because both China and South Asian countries face increasing water shortages due to urbanization, industrialization, and climate change.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

- Traditional and nontraditional disputes between China and South Asia can only be solved through cooperation. The two sides could use lessons learned from previous cooperative efforts on nontraditional threats to strengthen their collaboration and take preventive steps to ensure peace and prosperity in the region.
- Bilateral cooperation has occurred in agriculture, poverty reduction, health and disaster management, and energy and climate change. However, the two sides should also explore solutions at a multilateral level, such as the China-SAARC cooperative mechanism.
- Cooperative measures are crucial for addressing several sensitive issues, particularly terrorism, growing food and energy demands, and water security. These nontraditional security challenges have the potential to exacerbate existing disputes in the region, especially between China and India.
China's relations with South Asia have been dominated by traditional security issues. China and India's unresolved border dispute and the unending India-Pakistan confrontation have limited the academic exploration of nontraditional security trends in South Asia and their implications for China. In the past decade, China and India have agreed that development is a priority to achieve their respective national strategic goals. The two countries have also reached a consensus that maintaining good political relations is the best security guarantee and the key to their simultaneous emergence as global powers. To a certain extent, this consensus reflects a change in perception by both sides on the nature of security. Unfortunately, however, the conservative forces that only focus on military security are still strong in each country, especially India. As a result, the future of China-India relations is often deliberated in the context of power competition, while China's relations with Pakistan and the smaller South Asian countries continue to be observed through the narrow prism of regional balance of power.

In an era of globalization, nontraditional security is no less relevant than traditional security. Neglecting nontraditional threats may exacerbate existing mutual distrust triggered by traditional security challenges. This essay attempts to draw attention to the impacts of nontraditional security challenges on China's relations with the subcontinent. The first section identifies China's and South Asia's common concerns over nontraditional security and their joint efforts to address these issues. The second section examines the nontraditional challenges currently facing China's relations with the region. The third section explores the potential trajectories of these challenges.

Common Interests and Cooperation between China and South Asia in Dealing with Nontraditional Security Threats

China and South Asia face similar nontraditional security threats. These challenges include managing limited arable land to feed the largest populations in the world, eradicating poverty and upgrading living standards, coping with environmental problems, and reducing growing dependence on imported oil.

According to the United Nation's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), China's per capita arable land is only 80.3 hectares per thousand people, while South Asia's is 129.5 hectares per thousand people. Both are far below the world average of 223.5 hectares.¹ This means that China and the South Asian countries are using one-fifth of the world's arable land to sustain two-fifths of the world population.

Due to the rapid economic growth of the past decades, both China and South Asia have made significant achievements in poverty reduction. However, 15.9% of China's population and 40.3% of South Asia's population still live in extreme poverty (defined as living on less than $1.25 per day). The number of people living in poverty in both regions—803.3 million—is almost three times the size of the U.S. population.² Although China is the third-largest economy in the world, it ranks only 125th in terms of per capita gross national income (GNI), which at $3,650 is far below the

world average of $8,732. The situation in South Asia is even worse, with a per capita GNI of only $1,107, just a little bit above the low-income line of $509.³

With a higher per capita GNI, China is better able to address its human and health security issues than South Asia is; however, China’s and South Asia’s tasks are equally arduous in terms of meeting people’s demands for a better standard of living and narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor. As development remains the top priority for both China and South Asian countries, they are caught in the dilemma of balancing economic growth and addressing global climate change. On the one hand, as developing countries, these states “and the poorest people who live in them, are the most vulnerable to climate change.”⁴ On the other hand, these countries must protect their “right of development” by resisting pressure from more developed countries to undertake legally binding obligations to reduce emissions that go “beyond their socio-economic capacity.”⁵

Fast economic growth has also generated a high level of Chinese and Indian dependence on imported oil. At present, China and India are respectively the second- and fifth-largest consumers of oil in the world. While for years India has been dependent on imports for more than 70% of its oil, in 2009 China imported 52% of the oil the country consumed.⁶ The globally recognized threshold for an energy security alert is 50%. Given that both countries’ oil demand will continue to grow and that domestic oil production will likely decline, energy security will remain a great challenge for China and India in the years to come.

China’s and South Asia’s common concerns provide a great opportunity for cooperation, which in some instances has already given rise to a unified voice in multilateral forums. First, China and South Asia have a good record in agricultural cooperation. China, for example, has launched joint breeding programs with Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh. Under these programs, China attempts to help these countries “achieve maximum productivity of hybrid rice” through transferring germplasm technology and training experts.⁷ China has also agreed to provide Pakistan with drip-irrigation technology.⁸ Additionally, in 2006, China and India committed to exchanging agricultural experts, sharing irrigation technology, and promoting joint research on germplasm and breeding material.⁹

In terms of environmental security, China and South Asia are members of the G-77 plus China, and have insisted that the Kyoto Protocol should be the foundation of international negotiations on climate change. In October 2009, China and India signed an agreement on combating climate change. They also agreed to work closely with each other on scientific assessment of the impacts of climate change, capacity-building, joint R&D activities, and energy conservation and efficiency.¹⁰

⁸ Ibid.